Refugee Policy and Foreign Policy: Examining Policy Linkage in Chinese Relations with North Korea, Myanmar, and Vietnam

Lam, Jasmine

Refugee Policy and Foreign Policy: Examining Policy Linkage in Chinese Relations with North Korea, Myanmar, and Vietnam

By Jasmine Lam
2013, Vol. 5 No. 10 | pg. 3/6 | « »

China & Myanmar

Compared to the case in North Korea, China’s policy towards Burmese refugees is slightly more accommodative, as China provides temporary assistance at the border. From 1949 onwards, Sino-Burmese relations was marked with suspicions and mutual distrust. Only up until the 1970s and 80s did bilateral relations improve. Regardless, the Burmese government continually attempts to reduce its dependence on China and remain neutral in its foreign policy by balancing China and developing ties with the West. As a result of this unsteady bilateral relationship, China’s policy towards Burmese refugees has rested in the middle of the spectrum between accommodation and refusal. In the two incidences in 2009 and 2012 as illustrated below, China provided Burmese refugees temporary relief, while at the same time refusing to recognize them as “refugees.”

Historic Overview and Sino-Burmese Relations

The beginnings of PRC and Myanmar’s bilateral relations were marked with mutual distrust. Myanmar is situated at a historically significant juncture, at the crossroads of China, India, and the region of Southeast Asia. When the state gained independence in 1948 from the British, the new regime, then under the name Union of Burma, 63 had to make a decision to align itself with either the West or the East. However, being located beside the Chinese giant, who has in history invaded Burmese territory, Burma had well-founded fears of China’s intentions.64 Moreover, after the opposition group Kuomintang (KMT) fled China following the establishment of the PRC, KMT elements with support from Western states used Burma as a base to wage attacks into China through the Yunnan border. By 1953, there was an estimated 16,000 KMT troops in northeast Burma.65 Burma, a still newly founded state at this point, did not have sufficient capacity to rid itself of KMT elements. Because of this, Burma further feared China would use this as an excuse for invasion. With these suspicions in mind, Burma decided to please China first, and became the first non-Communist country to recognize the PRC. In 1954, a Joint Declaration and a treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression were signed between the two countries. Nonetheless, during the period that followed, Burma under the U Nu regime (1948-1962) continued to view China with suspicions, and mutual distrust coloured their relations.66

In order to fully understand Sino-Burmese relations, there needs to be an examination of security issues that underlie their shared-border. For Burma, the border area in the northeast region is home to an array of ethnic militias seeking independence. During colonization, the British pursued a divide-and-conquer tactic, supporting minority ethnic groups over the majority Burman group.67 When independence came, the Burman group gained power and stripped minority groups of their previous privilege. As minorities were pushed from the center to rural areas, they began to regroup in attempts to regain power. These groups eventually formalized into factions such as the Karen (Kayin) National Liberation Army (KNLA) (the armed force of Karen National Union), Communist Party of Burma (CPB), United Wa State Army, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).68 Overtime, some of these ethnic groups became associated with illicit drug trades, taking part in the infamous Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia.69

On the other hand, bordering Burma is China’s Yunnan province, seen as “China’s wild southwest.”70 This perception of Yunnan has historic roots, as dynasties have long had difficulty consolidating control in this territory. The central government has been pursuing strategies to increase integration of Yunnan into China, as the province has a sizeable non-Han population. For example, the Western Development Strategy aims to develop the province economically.71 Another problem is the extension of the illicit drug trade from the Burmese side into China, which raised concerns for the Chinese government, who eventually led drug crackdowns in the area.72 The widespread narcotics problem has captured international attention. On May 29, 2003, the United States government labeled the United Wa Sate Army as a narcotic trafficking organization.73 For China, this is worrying because this may justify United States intervention in the area. Because of these security concerns, both states would benefit from stability at the Sino-Burmese border areas.

With this in mind, Burmese ethnic minorities form an important factor in their bilateral relations. If China decides to provide support to these groups, this can greatly destabilize the Burmese regime and deteriorate bilateral relations. The 1960s Chinese Cultural Revolution saw radicals in China exporting Communism into Burma, and establishing relations with minority groups such as the CBP and the KIA. 74 In Burma, Chinese embassies were openly distributing copies of Mao Zedong’s revolutionary Little Red Book.75 In one incidence, a large insurgent force of the CBP, officered by the Chinese, crossed over from the Yunnan border and seized territory in Burma’s eastern hills.76 In return, Burma showed discontent towards Chinese behaviour, and Chinese residing in Rangoon faced attacks from local mobs.77

After the Cultural Revolution and going into the 1970s, Sino-Burmese relations saw improvement. China began to slowly drop its support for ethnic minority groups, in favour of developing more economic ties and border stability. When the Burmese State Law and Order Restoration Council took power in 1988, it marked the turning point when the relationship between China and Burma became a “strategic alignment.”78 For Burma, which faced international diplomatic isolation following the 8888 Uprising, establishing good relations with China was highly beneficial.79 The same year, a border agreement in Beijing was signed, legitimizing and opening border trade between the two countries. By the 1980s, China has completely ended support for the CPB and other ethnic minority forces aiming to topple the Burmese government.80 During this time, China used its ties to these minority groups to assist the government to negotiate cease-fire agreements with them. By the 1990s, 27 cease-fire agreements were signed, which gave these groups the power to retain control of their territories.81 Since then, border trade between Burma and China increased remarkably. In recent years, there is an estimated one million Chinese businessmen in Myanmar.82 Assistance in other areas bloomed as well. In military aid, China has exported more than $1.4 billion worth of supplies.83 In 2010, $4.2 billion worth of interest-free-loans over a 30-year period was given to Myanmar to help fund development in hydroelectricity, physical infrastructure, and information technology.84

The discovery of gas fields off the shores of Myanmar in the 1990s presented itself as another occasion to further develop the ties between China and Burma. Proven resources stand at about 10 trillion cubic feet, but some estimates run as high as 90 trillion cubic feet, making this discovery the 10^th largest gas fields in the world.85 The Burmese government held a consortium to decide who would be granted a contract to develop the gas fields, and attendees included companies from India, South Korea, and China. For China, to sustain a rapidly expanding economy, this was a perfect opportunity. This was important strategically as well because the proposed pipeline would connect China to the Indian Ocean, and reduce dependent on the congested Malacca Strait for current fuel transportation from the Middle East.86 In addition, the pipeline would run from Myanmar through Yunnan province, helping expand the Yunnan economy in accordance to China’s Western Development Strategy. China’s test to demonstrate its political stance towards Myanmar came when the United Nations Security Council proposed a Resolution condemning Myanmar for its human rights abuses.87 In favour to Myanmar, China used its Security Council membership to veto the resolution. For Myanmar, this helped alleviate international pressure on its regime. Through this, China displayed public support for Myanmar both economically and politically. In November 2008, the agreement to build a $1.5 billion oil pipeline and a $1.04 billion natural gas pipeline with China was accepted. This was finalized with signed agreements in 2009.

Refugee Treatment

There have been two episodes of refugee inflows in 2009 and again in 2011, both resulting from a government crackdown on ethnic minorities in northeast Myanmar. While the first incident saw China giving refugees temporary assistance, during the second instance, China has been erring more to the side of refusal and repatriation. The shift indicates higher levels of cooperation, at least in terms of communication, between the two states.

2009 Kokang Incident

In August 2009, the Burmese government launched an attack against the minority groups Kokang, Wa, and Kachin in the Special Region of northern Shan state, adjacent to the Sino-Burmese border. The Kokang people form the majority of the population in the area. They are in fact ethnic mandarin-speaking Han Chinese who arrived in what is now Shan state today in the 18^th century. From the 1960s up until 1989, the CPB ruled the Region. The dissolution of the Party in 1989, along with the end of China’s support for the Party facilitated ceasefire agreements between ethnic minority groups and the Burmese government. The establishment of the area as a Special Region gave the Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), control over the territory. The Kokang had been involved in illegal drug trades and were known to be major opium producers.88

When the Myanmar Armed Forces (formally known as the Tatamadaw) attacked on August 29^th 2009,89 no warning was given to the Chinese government. As the attacks were targeted at population based on their ethnicity, this renders citizens who flee as refugees. Conflict in the area prompted 10,000 - 30,000 Burmese refugees to flee into Yunnan within the span of a month. Local Chinese authorities immediately provided emergency shelter, food, and medical care to the refugees.90 UNHCR regional spokesman confirms the Chinese assistance in aid and medical care.91 While China offers humanitarian aid and has no intentions of pushing refugees back into the conflict zone, China does not wish to have refugees settling further inland.92 Furthermore, China never declared incoming Burmese residents as refugees.93 On the official end, the Chinese government openly expressed its discontent. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswomen Jiang Yu stated that “China hoped Myanmar could properly solve its domestic issues and safeguard the stability of its border with China,” a rare statement for a country intent on non-interference.94 As the Tatmadaw won a quick, decisive victory over the Kokang MNDAA by August 31^st, 2009, the next day, around two-thirds of refugees who entered China had returned to their homes in Myanmar.95

2011 Incident

In June 2011, skirmishes began between the Burmese government and the KIA in the Kachin state, ending another 17-year ceasefire agreement. Tensions had been brewing between the Burmese government and KIA over the past year. In the 2010 elections, Kachin candidates have been blocked from participating, even though the Kachin Independence Organisation (the political wing of KIA) has been participating in and cooperating with the government’s roadmap to democracy since the 1990s.96 However, KIA ignored several deadlines that the Burmese government have set for incorporation of KIA elements under the Tatmadaw. Meanwhile, KIA called for a withdrawal of all Tatmadaw forces near KIA posts in the Kachin state. Some sources point to the construction of the hydroelectric dams, built by the Chinese companies, as a contributing factor to the conflict.97 These dams are deeply unpopular in the area, and are perceived as destructive to the environment and society.98

As conflict intensified, an estimated 7,000 – 10,000 Burmese citizens fled into China.99 Human Rights Watch stated that in Myanmar, the Tatmadaw have been entering villages to interrogate and torture local residents in efforts to uncover affiliations with the KIA.100 Accounts of forced labour, destruction of property and livelihoods are reported.101 As a result of this conflict, and of well-founded fears of persecution from the government on the basis that they are Kachin residents, Burmese citizens who flee into China are recognized as refugees under the UN Convention.

However, in contrast to the 2009 incident, China has been much less accommodative to Burmese refugees. Quieter Chinese reaction to this incident, in contrast to China’s outspoken discontent with the 2009 incident, would according to the hypothesis, reflect a higher level of cooperation between China and Myanmar in 2011. That is, while China was unhappy about the lack of warning from the Burmese government in 2009, it appears the Chinese government received notice about the impending attack in 2011. Given that the recent nature of the event, research has not found confirmation that the Chinese government was given warning in 2011. However, since China has had no problem displaying its discontent when no warning is given in the past, the non-event of a disapproving public statement suggests that sufficient notice was given to the Chinese government. The official stance of China, as exemplified by the spokesperson for Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hong Lei, disputes the refugee status of incoming Burmese people.102 As such, no international aid groups are allowed in the border area. Burmese refugees who have entered China have so far lacked access to proper sanitation, shelter, healthcare or schools.103 The Democratic Voice of Burma reported that there are around 10,000 Kachins living in makeshift tents on the Chinese side of the border, while some are hiding in the jungle. Furthermore, it has been reported that China is refusing to allow certain refugees to cross the border, claiming that there is no fighting on the Burmese side.104 In other cases, there are forced repatriations back into the Burmese conflict zone.105 This points to a higher level of cooperation between the two states. In accordance to the hypothesis, Chinese refugee policies became stricter, and repatriation was practiced.Continued on Next Page »

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Endnotes

1.) Valerie M. Hudson, “The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis,” in Foreign Policy: theories, actors, cases, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 12.

2.) For foreign policy decision-making, see Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University, Organizational Behaviour Section, 1954). For bureaucratic and organizational politics, see Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: HarperCollins, 1971); Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974). For psychological analyses, see Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” International Security 25:4 (2001): 107-146. For comparative foreign policy, see P. McGowan and H. B. Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1973).

3.) See chapters William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and foreign policy”; Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and foreign policy;” Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Constructivism and foreign policy,” in Foreign Policy: theories, actors, cases, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 31-82.

4.) See Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51:1 (October 1998): 144-172.

5.) Hudson, 27.

6.) Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, “International Factors in the Formation of Refugee Movements,” International Migration Review 20:2 (Summer 1986): 155.

7.) Ibid.

8.) Michael S. Teitelbaum, “Immigration, refugees, and foreign policy,” International Organization 38:3 (Summer 1984): 429-50.

9.) Ibid, 437-9.

10.) Gil Loescher, “Introduction,” in Refugee and International Relations, ed. Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 12.

11.) Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher, ed. Refugees in International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

12.) Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher, “Refugees in International Relations,” in Refugees in International Relations, ed. Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3.

13.) Jack Snyder, “Realism, Refugees, and Strategies of Humanitarianism,” in Refugees in International Relations, ed. Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 29.

14.) Myron Weiner, “The Clash of Norms – Dilemmas in Refugee Policies,” Journal of Refugee Studies 11:4 (1998): 433.

15.) Snyder, “Realism,” 32.

16.) Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner, Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003).

17.) Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Aid (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005).

18.) See John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924); Hans Moregnthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 1948).

19.) “Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva: 1967), accessed August 22, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html.

20.) Charles B. Keely, “How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows,” International Migration Review 30:4 (Winter 1996): 1057.

21.) Loescher, 17.

22.) Ibid.

23.) Betts and Loescher, 9.

24.) Ibid, 2.

25.) Ming Liu, “China and the North Korean Crisis: Facing Test and Transition,” Pacific Affairs 76:3 (2003): 348.

26.) China has exerted 2000 years of influence on Korea. Up until 1910, China carried out the role as a patron under a feudal regime, assisting Korea in the development of its political and cultural civilization. See Debin Zhan, “Chinese People’s Understanding of the Korean Unification Issue,” Asian Social Science 8:3 (2012): 64.

27.) Jian Cai, “The Korea Nuclear Crisis: The Changing Sino-DPRK Relationship,” Asian Perspective 34:1 (2010): 152.

28.) Xiaohe Cheng, “The Evolution of Sino-North Korean Relations in the 1960s,” Asian Perspective 34:2 (2010): 176.

29.) Hyeungkyu Kim, “From a buffer zone to a strategic burden: evolving Sino-North Korea relations during the Hu Jintao era,” The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis 22:1 (2010): 59.

30.) Cheng, 180.

31.) Zhan, 57.

32.) Cheng, 191.

33.) Daniel Goma, “The Chinese-Korean Border Issue: An Analysis of a Contested Frontier,” Asian Survey 46:6 (2006): 875.

34.) Cheng, 191-2.

35.) “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he Chaoxian minzhu zhuyi renmin gongheguo zhengfu lianhe gongbao” (“Joint Communiqué of the People’s Republic and the Governmnet of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”), People’s Daily, April 9^th, 1970.

36.) Taekyoon Kim, “Strategizing aid: US-China food aid relations to North Korea in the 1990s,” International Relations of Asia-Pacific 12 (2012): 55.

37.) Kim, “Strategizing aid,” 56.

38.) Liu, 363-4.

39.) China avoided participation in 1994 because Sino-United States and Sino-North Korean relations were at low-points in the 1990s. Following the Tianamen incident in 1989, United States condemned China for its actions and imposed sanctions. Strained Sino-North Korean relations are described above.

40.) Liu, 347.

41.) Kim, “From a buffer zone,” 66.

42.) See Robert Scalapino, “China and Korean reunification – a neighbour’s concerns,” in Korea’s Future and the Great Powers, ed. Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001), 107-124.

43.) Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea (Washington, DC: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011), 30.

44.) Ibid.

45.) Blaine Harden, Escape from Camp 14: One Man’s Remarkable Odyssey from North Korea to Freedom in the West (London: The Penguin Group, 2012), 38.

46.) Keumsoon Lee, The Border-crossing North Koreans: Current Situations and Future Prospects (Korea Institute for National Unification, 2006),10-11.

47.) Ibid, 11.

48.) Human Rights Watch, “The Invisible Exodus: North Korean in the PRC,” November 2002, 14:8 (C), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/northkorea/.

49.) Haggard and Noland, 28.

50.) Fan Bai, “Siwang xianshang zhengzha de beihan xiaonanmin” (“The deathly struggle of North Korean refugees”), Epoch Times, June 14, 2009, accessed August 21, 2012, http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/9/6/12/n2555767.htm.

51.) Human Rights Watch.

52.) “China building North Korea fence,” Taipei Times, October 18, 2006, accessed August 17, 2012, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2006/10/18/2003332245.

53.) Liu, 352.

54.) Human Rights Watch.

55.) Liu, 354.

56.) See Thomas McCarthy,“China and North Korean ‘Refugees’,” Special Report, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network (2002); Liu, 353.

57.) Lee, 41.

58.) Ibid, 42.

59.) Human Rights Watch.

60.) Bai.

61.) Ibid.

62.) Most recently, China is in process of repatriating up to 30 North Koreans who had been arrested. See “Seoul urges China on North Korea refugees,” BBC News, February 22, 2012, accessed August 21, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17123208.

63.) The paper will use the name “Burma” (Union of Burma) until the paper begins to discuss the time period after 2008, the year when the Burma changed its official name to Republic of the Union of Myanmar.

64.) Hongwei Fan, “Sino-Burmese Relations 1949-1953,” in China in the World: Contemporary Issues and Perspectives, ed. Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh and Joanne Hoi-Lee Loh (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of China Studies, 2008), 80.

65.) Ibid, 77.

66.) Michael Charney, “U Nu, China and the ‘Burmese’ Cold War: Propaganda in Burma in the 1950s,” in The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds, ed. Zheng Yangwen, Hong Liu and Michael Szonyi (Boston: Brill, 2010), 42.

67.) Joshua Kurlantzick, “Myanmar: The Next Failed State?” Current History 110:737 (2011): 242.

68.) Norman G. Owen et al., “Burma becomes Myanmar,” in The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia, ed. Norman G. Owen et al. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 500.

69.) N. Ganesan, “Myanmar-China Relations: Interlocking Interests but Independent Output,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 12:1 (2011): 107.

70.) Thant Myint-U, Where China Meets India (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 141.

71.) Ibid, 131.

72.) Ganesan, 107.

73.) Ian Storey, “Emerging Fault Lines in Sino-Burmese Relations: The Kokang Incident,” China Brief 9:18 (2009): 6.

74.) Owen et al., 500.

75.) Myint-U, 51.

76.) Ibid, 52.

77.) Ibid, 51.

78.) Poon Kim Shee, “The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Relations: Strategic and Economic Dimensions,” Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies 1 (2002): 34.

79.) From 1962 to 1988, the Ne Win regime of the Burma Socialist Programme Party dominated and pursued socialist policies to develop the country. However, these policies failed to vitalize the economy, and instead plunged Burma into poverty. The state had to rely on authoritarianism to control its citizens. The legacy of totalitarianism remained and Burma has long been criticized for its human rights abuses. Between 1989-1999, multi-party elections were held. This captured the international community’s attention, as Burmese-born, British-National Aung Yang Suu Kyi returned to Burma to lead the democratic movement. However, when the Democratic Party won the elections, the results were ignored. Popular protests against these actions, known infamously as the 8888 Uprising (on August 8^th, 1988), were later violently crushed. The military swept in and established the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Since then, Burma has been in the international limelight for its undemocratic practices and human rights abuses. Consequently, economic, political sanctions and isolation from the international community persisted. Nonetheless, in 2003, General and Prime Minister Khin Nyunt announced a 7-step “roadmap” to “disciplined democracy.”

80.) Owen et al., 504.

81.) Storey, 6.

82.) Kurlantzick, 245.

^{^[83]} Bertil Lintner, “Realpolitik and the Myanmar Spring,” Foreign Policy, November 30, 2011, accessed July 24, 2012,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/30/democracy_myanmar_china_clinton?page=0,1.

84.) Ibid, 2.

85.) Myint-U, 72.

86.) Lintner, 2.

87.) “Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Myanmar Owing to Negative Votes by China, Russia Federation,” United Nations Security Council, last modified January 12, 2007, accessed August 21, 2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8939.doc.htm.

88.) Larry Jagan, “Border war rattles China-Myanmar ties,” Asia Times, September 1, 2009, accessed July 25, 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KI01Ae04.html.

89.) Ibid. Tensions had been building up prior to the attack, as Myanmar troops began to take up positions in the Kokang area in early August. In April 2009, the Burmese government demanded ethnic militias, including the Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), United Wa Sate Army, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), to disarm or to convert into Border Guard Forces under the command of the Tatmadaw. However, these groups rejected these demands, in fear of losing their autonomy and business interests, as the 1989 ceasefire agreements have allowed them to maintain control over their territory. Earlier in August, the three groups, along with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) formed an alliance – the Myanmar Peace and Democracy Front – and agreed to not surrender their arms before elections in 2010. On the other hand, for the Burmese government, the elections gave it incentive to demonstrate military victory and authority across the country. To justify the attack, the government claimed that their operation was a drug raid. Effectively, renewed fighting broke two decades of ceasefire.

90.) T. Fuller, “Refugees Flee to China as Fighting Breaks Out in Myanmar,” New York Times, August 29^th, 2009.

91.) “Myanmar fighters cross into China,” Al Jazeera, August 30, 2009, accessed July 25, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2009/08/20098306161918344.html.

92.) Jagan.

93.) Royston Chan, “China tents dismantled as refugees return to Myanmar,” Reuters, September 1, 2009, accessed July 25, 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/09/01/uk-china-myanmar-sb-idUKTRE5800WI20090901.

94.) “Myanmar border inhabitants begin to return from China as situation calms,” Xinhua News, August 30, 2009, accessed July 25, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/30/content_11966205.htm.

95.) Chan.

^{^[96]} Tania Branigan, “Burma’s military junta accused of torturing and killing ethnic rebels,” The Guardian, December 18, 2011, accessed July 18, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/18/burma-military-junta-kachin-rebels.

^{^[97]}See Jonathan Watts, “Dozens killed in Burma amid clashes over Chinese dams,” The Guardian, June 16, 2011, accessed July 24, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/16/china-burma-hydropower-clashes; “Hydropower Dams Fuelling Conflict in Burma,” Burma Rivers Network, June 15, 2011, accessed July 24, 2012, http://www.burmapartnership.org/2011/06/hydropower-dams-fuelling-conflict-in-burma/.

98.) “Hydropower Dams Fuelling Conflict in Burma.”

99.) James Bourne, “No Assistance for Kachin Refugees,” Radio Free Asia, June 26, 2012, accessed July 19, 2012, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/burma/refugees-06262012165817.html/.

100.) Matthew F. Smith, “Isolated in Yunnan: Kachin Refugees from Burma in China’s Yunnan Province,” Human Rights Watch (June 2012).

^{^[101]} Branigan.

^{^[102]}Bourne.

^{^[103]} “China accused of forcing Burma refugees back to war zone,” The Guardian, June 26, 2012, accessed July 18, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/26/china-accused-returning-burma-refugees.

^{^[104]} Htwe Ko, “Chinese authorities push Kachin refugees back into Burma,” Democratic Voice of Burma, July 18, 2012, accessed July 18, 2012, http://www.dvb.no/news/chinese-authorities-push-kachin-refugees-back-into-burma/22870.

105.) “China accused of forcing Burma refugees back to war zone.”

106.) See Jian Chen, “China and the First Indo-China War, 1950-54,” The China Quarterly 133 (1993): 106; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1965 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 6.

107.) Charles Kraus, “A border region ‘exuded with militant friendship’: Provincial narratives of China’s participation in the First Indochina War, 1949-1954,” Cold War History 12:3 (2011): 495. After the First Indochina War, the Geneva Conference held on July 21, 1954 divided Vietnam at the 17^th parallel. The north of the parallel was under control of the Viet Minh as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, while the south became the State of Vietnam. As stipulated at the Geneva Conference, this provisional division was to be upheld until nationwide elections are held in 1956.

108.) Jian Chen, “China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69,” The China Quarterly 142 (June 1995): 356.

109.) Ming Guo, Zhong Yue guanxi yanbian sishinian (The Evolution of Sino-Vietnamese Relations over the Past Forty Years) (Nanning, China: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1992), 53.

110.) Chen, “China and the First Indo-China War,” 106.

111.) Ibid, 107-8.

112.) Kosal Path, “The economic factor in the Sino-Vietnamese split, 1972-75: An analysis of Vietnamese archival sources,” Cold War History 11:4 (2011): 519.

113.) Chen, “China’s Involvement,” 358.

114.) Ibid, 359.

115.) Aiguo Qu, “Chinese supporters in the operations to assist Vietnam and resist America” (paper presented at the “International Workshop on New Evidence on China, Southeast Aisa and the Vietnam War,” Hong Kong, January 11-12, 2000): 40.

116.) Chen, “China’s Involvement,” 371.

117.) Ibid, 370.

118.) Ibid, 386.

119.) Path, 522.

120.) First, China was experiencing domestic hardship resulting from the failure of the Cultural Revolution of 1966, which limited China’s capacity to provide the large-scale assistance it was able to before. Second, declining threat from the United States led to President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. Third, after the Sino-Soviet split, containing Soviet influence in the region became tantamount. It was thus essential to pull Vietnam away from Soviet’s orbit of influence.

121.) Path, 529.

122.) Ibid, 530.

123.) Xiaoming Zhang, “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment,” The China Quarterly 184 (December 2005): 855.

124.) Path, 540.

125.) John C. Donnell, “Vietnam 1979: Year of Calamity,” Asian Survey 20:1 (1980): 22.

126.) Zhang, 865.

127.) Ibid, 853.

128.) Ibid, 867.

129.) Barry Wain, “The Indochina Refugee Crisis,” Foreign Affairs 58:1 (1979): 161.

130.) Hungdah Chiu, “China’s Legal Position on Protecting Chinese Residents in Vietnam,” The American Journal of International Law 74:3 (1980): 685.

131.) Wain, 163.

132.) Ibid, 163-4.

133.) Donnell, 27.

134.) Wain, 171.

135.) Ibid, 164.

136.) Ibid, 172.

137.) “Refugees of Rhetoric Victims in a neighbourly conflict,” Time Magazine 112:6, August 7, 1978, 52.

138.) Wain, 166.

139.) Shouyi Fan, trans., “Jilaizhi, zeanzhi: 20 wan yuenan nanmin zai zhongguo shengcun diaocha” (Now that they have come, we must help them settle down: an investigation of the living conditions of 200,000 Vietnamese refugees in China), China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House 12 (2007): 15. Office of UNHCR “highly acclaimed the Chinese government’s efforts to make arrangements for settling the refugees in China,” and stated that the “placement of Vietnamese refugees within its borders is one of the most successful models for settlement of refugees.”

140.) Tom Lam, “The Exodus of Hoa Refugees from Vietnam and their Settlement in Guangxi: China’s Refugee Settlement Strategies,” Journal of Refugee Studies 13:4 (2000): 378.

141.) Ibid.

142.) Ibid.

143.) Ibid, 379.

144.) Ibid, 389.

145.) Ibid, 384-386.

146.) “North Koreans in China: UNHCR asks for access,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, last modified January 21, 2003, accessed August 16, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/3e2d3f98f.html.

147.) “Trade with Countries and Regions in Asia (2010/01-04),” Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, last modified May 26, 2010, accessed August 16, 2012, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/statistic/lanmubb/ASEAN/201005/20100506934001.html.

148.) Ibid.

149.) C. Y. Chang, “Overseas Chinese in China’s Policy,” The China Quarterly 82 (June 1980): 283.

150.) Chiu, 688.

151.) See “Kim Jong-un meets with senior Chinese officials,” The Telegraph, August 3, 2012, accessed August 16, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9448404/Kim-Jong-un-meets-with-senior-Chinese-officials.html; “North Korea’s Kim Jong-un may be planning first China trip,” The Telegraph, July 31, 2012, accessed August 16, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9440146/North-Koreas-Kim-Jong-un-may-be-planning-first-China-trip.html.

152.) “Situation of human rights in Myanmar,” United Nations General Assembly, last modified March 13, 2007, accessed August 21, 2012, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/508/29/PDF/N0650829.pdf?OpenElement.

153.) Ganesan, 105.

154.) Ibid, 97.

155.) Betts and Loescher, “Refugees in International Relations,” 9.

156.) “23.6 Refugee and Asylee Adjustment under Section 209 of the Act,” United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, last modified June 21, 2006, accessed August 22, 2012, http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-8624/0-0-0-9785.html.

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