To fully understand how foreign policy and refugee policy are related, one must first examine the definition of a “refugee,” as well as the development of the international refugee regime. The international refugee regime and the way states respond to refugee flows have been shaped and have evolved with changes in the international system. The refugee regime is inherently linked to the fundamentals of the nation-state, which is premised on the most basic function and responsibility of the state to offer protection to its citizens. When citizens of a state decide to flee a country, in essence this represents a failure on part of the nation-state, as the state is unable to offer its citizens political, economic, or societal protection. The consequences of refugee flows are transnational, and because of this, these movements carry the potential to threaten international stability. As a result, the international refugee regime was developed to maintain international stability by creating appropriate institutions to respond to refugee flows.
The contemporary refugee regime finds its roots during the inter-war period under the League of Nations. It was not until post-World War II that the regime became more developed under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The first piece of legislation that formed the basis of international refugee protection is the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Under this Convention, a refugee is defined as:
“Any person who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group of political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” -U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1, Section A(2), 1951
When the Cold War began, political motivations became evident in approaches to refugees. First, the refugee regime, as was the UN, was Western-dominated and focused mainly on movement within Europe and towards North America. Western countries encouraged flight from Communist countries, and gave a “virtual guarantee of resettlement” to those who leave. It was not until 1967, when the
Protocol on Refugees was codified, that protection was expanded to include groups from other nations. During this time, there was also a shift in the international refugee movement. In the 1970s, refugee flows from the Communist bloc slowed, as the totalitarian regimes there clamped down on escapees. Meanwhile, developing countries in Africa and Asia began to gain independence, and ensuing civil unrest prompted an outflow of refugees seeking asylum in industrialized countries. However, the treatment towards these groups was not the same. Western countries began to feel the strain in incorporating refugees into their societies, and refugee admission became increasingly restrictive.
With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international refugee regime was in turn affected by a new configuration of the international system. Into the 21st century, the effects of 9/11 have strengthened states’ position on restricting asylum and refugee protection, as states pointed to the threat of transnational terrorism. New types of war, such as terrorism and proxy wars, gave justification for international intervention to prevent possible refugee flows. Meanwhile, the scope of UNHCR has expanded to include protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Today, as refugees are finding it more difficult to find asylum in developed countries, flows between developed countries are becoming increasingly characteristic of refugee movements globally. As a result, literature focusing on movements between developing countries deserves more attention.
This section examines bilateral relations and compares Chinese refugee policies across three different groups: North Korea, Myanmar, and Vietnam. The time period under scrutiny is from the establishment of the PRC in 1949 up until the first refugee episode with each of the three bordering states. China is a signatory to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, and is thus obliged to follow the stipulated laws. However, there is often a mismatch between the laws stated in the Convention and China’s domestic policies on refugees. While the UNHCR has recognized citizens fleeing from North Korea, Myanmar, and Vietnam as refugees during each incident, China does not recognize refugees from North Korea and Myanmar, but recognizes those from Vietnam. Moreover, there is variation in China’s treatment of each group in terms of the level of assistance China provides. Through this research, I found that these differences can be explained through nuances in China’s bilateral relations with each state. Therefore, this section provides an account of bilateral relations between China and each of the three states, followed by a description of Chinese reaction towards incoming refugees.
China has followed a consistent policy of repatriation towards North Koreans crossing the border into China. North Korean refugees have been entering China steadily since 1983, with sharp increases during North Korea’s famine in the mid-1990s. Relations between the two countries have often been described as a special one, characterized by historic, cultural and ideological affinity. However, after the nuclear crises in the 2000s, relations between China and North Korea have been evolving to resemble a more pragmatic, state-to-state relationship. All in all, North Korean and Chinese relations fall at the far end of the spectrum, defined with a high level of cooperation, and a corresponding closed-door refugee policy with repatriation.
China and North Korea have long held a “blood-cemented relationship.” Historically, China has exerted influence in the Korean peninsula, and defended the area against invasions. This is important because, first off, North Korea is geopolitically strategic for China. With the commencement of the Cold War, and the establishment of the PRC, a Chinese-friendly regime in Korea is paramount to serve as a buffer zone against Western powers and capitalism. During the Korean War, China immediately joined in support for North Korea in 1950. Their partnership in this war formed the aforementioned “blood-cemented relationship” between the two states. Through maintaining the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), China could expend fewer military resources to securitize its borders. Secondly, the North Korean and Chinese regimes hold ideological affinity, sharing cultural and revolutionary ties. The traditional school of thinkers in China, as described in Heungkyu Kim’s article, sees the Sino-North Korean relationship as a special, traditional one.
Since then, North Korea and China have upheld friendly relations. When North Korea embarked on its development plans after the Korean War, China’s assistance has been crucial to their success. China contributed 1,200,000 Chinese People’s Volunteers to help with reconstruction. From 1954 to 1957, China provided North Korea with 8 billion yuan worth of loans. All in all, China was vital for North Korea for security, economic and development purposes. In 1961, their bilateral relationship was further cemented through the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendly Treaty, whereby China agreed to support North Korea in cases of external military attacks. This treaty has been prolonged twice since, and is valid until 2021.
However, during the latter 1960s, broader Sino-Soviet-North Korean relations briefly affected Sino-North Korean relations negatively. Differences between China and the Soviet Union grew increasingly stark, and relations between the two deteriorated rapidly. While North Korea relied on China for support, North Korea also played on the Sino-Soviet relations to gain assistance from the Soviet Union. When North Korea warmed up to the Soviet Union, China retaliated diplomatically for North Korea’s lack of support. In Chinese public media, there were hardly any mentions of North Korea between 1967 and 1969. At the Sino-North Korean border, disputes arose over the contested Paekustan, and the region saw several military skirmishes. Despite the period of diplomatic isolation between China and North Korea during this period, which saw a distinct absence of high-level visits and new cultural and economic agreements, rapprochement between the two states was evident by the end of the 1960s. In 1970, a new communiqué was signed between the first Premier of China, Zhou Enlai, and North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, pronouncing that the two countries will “unite against the common enemy.”
Bilateral relations remained close until the 1990s, when Sino-North Korean relations were rocked by larger changes in the international system. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that China had find ways to maintain its interests in a unipolar, United States-dominated international system. As such, China began to normalize relations with South Korea, leading to full diplomatic normalization in 1992. In reaction to this, North Korea denounced China publicly. Meanwhile, however, North Korea faced its greatest famine in the mid-1990s. China utilized this opportunity to maintain Chinese influence in North Korea through provision of food and economic assistance. This was especially important for North Korea as it had recently lost a source of support with the fall of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, China became North Korea’s main patron, supplying nearly ¾ of North Korea’s food imports and 90% of gross imports of energy. This helped guard friendly bilateral relations between the two states, and justify China’s normalization with South Korea.
The North Korean nuclear crises in 2000s tested Sino-North Korean relations, as North Korea’s successful nuclear tests demonstrated a limitation to Chinese influence. While China avoided participation in the 1994 nuclear talks between United States and North Korea, China began to engage in an active role in the 2000s. China adopted a definitive stance to prevent nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula and to maintain stability in northeast Asia. It was thought that China could exercise its leverage to dissuade North Korea from pursuing nuclear development, because of China’s role as the major supplier for North Korea’s food and fuel imports. Resultantly, multi-party talks that were set up gave China the role of host and mediator. However, despite China’s involvement, North Korea carried out two successful nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, revealing the limitation of Chinese influence on the North Korean regime. Following these incidences, current literature describes an evolution of Sino-North Korean relations from the traditional “blood-cemented” one, to a more state-to-state relationship. In this sense, Chinese policy on North Korean refugees may alter according to this shift.
China has followed a consistent policy towards North Korean refugees, whereby China refuses to recognize incomers as “refugees.” The policy has been consistent, because the momentary lows in bilateral relations in mid-1960s and in early 1990s have been insufficient to cause a change in China’s refugee policies. In the 1960s, North Korean refugees entering China has not become a significant issue yet, as China has stated that North Korean refugees have not been entering China until 1983. When relations became strained again in the 1990s, China was still attempting to maintain cooperative relations with North Korea, as exemplified with China’s assistance to the North Korean famine. This helped redress their differences and upheld good relations.
Throughout time, China claims that North Korean border crossers are “economic migrants” and uses this to justify repatriation, as surveys conducted at borders show that 95% of incomers left for economic reasons. However, as economic circumstances are intrinsically tied to political characteristics of the regime, North Koreans fleeing their home country fall under the definition of refugees sur place. There is a distinct caste system in North Korea, in which social classes are determined at birth, and mobility between social categories is next to impossible. Furthermore, there are definite political consequences to repatriation. Refugees who are returned to North Korea after being caught are sent to labour camps, and branded as “traitors” to the regime. Punishment and exile extend to family members of the refugee. This renders North Koreans who fled North Korea as refugees sur place, persons who become entitled to protection as refugees due to the risk of political persecution lest they return. Therefore, such well-founded fears of political persecution designate North Koreans who cross the Sino-North Korean border as refugees under the UN Convention.
North Koreans have been entering China through the northeastern provinces of Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Liaoning provinces, and the two countries have taken measures to tighten border security. In the early 1960s, China and North Korea signed a secret agreement to govern security in the border area. However, since 1983, there have been steady increases of inflows. In 1986, border security was further consolidated in another agreement in which North Korea called for return of its citizens, and laid out specific security protocols. In 2006, construction of a 20-km long fence was completed along the border at Yalu River.
During the worst years of famine in North Korea in the mid-1990s, there was an estimated 20,000 – 30,000 refugees who entered PRC. Some sources even claim that numbers ranged as high as 300,000. Accurate figures are often difficult to obtain because no refugee organizations are officially permitted to operate at the border area, and North Korean refugees are often dispersed and under cover to avoid repatriation. During this time, some sources claim that China has privately permitted South Korean humanitarian and missionary groups to operate in the border area and provide assistance.
From July 1998 onwards, China has actively enforced its policy of repatriation. China held major roundup operations in northeastern provinces, and arrested around 100 North Korean refugees weekly. These searches were often launched after incidences relating to North Korean refugees were reported in major news media. While this deters other North Koreans from entering China, it demonstrates as well China’s concern in maintaining cooperative relations with North Korea publicly. A Human Rights Watch report has also stated that since 1999, China tightened its surveillance of South Korean humanitarian and missionary groups operating at border areas. In the Yanbian Korean Self-Governing District of Jilin Province, six detention camps have been set up for refugee deportation in recent years, as refugees in the area has exceeded 93,000. A document from the Border Patrol Bureau stated that as of the end of 2004, 133,009 North Koreans have been deported back to North Korea. To date, China has upheld its policy of repatriation.Continued on Next Page »
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Endnotes
1.) Valerie M. Hudson, “The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis,” in Foreign Policy: theories, actors, cases, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 12.
2.) For foreign policy decision-making, see Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University, Organizational Behaviour Section, 1954). For bureaucratic and organizational politics, see Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: HarperCollins, 1971); Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974). For psychological analyses, see Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” International Security 25:4 (2001): 107-146. For comparative foreign policy, see P. McGowan and H. B. Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1973).
3.) See chapters William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and foreign policy”; Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and foreign policy;” Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Constructivism and foreign policy,” in Foreign Policy: theories, actors, cases, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 31-82.
4.) See Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51:1 (October 1998): 144-172.
5.) Hudson, 27.
6.) Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, “International Factors in the Formation of Refugee Movements,” International Migration Review 20:2 (Summer 1986): 155.
7.) Ibid.
8.) Michael S. Teitelbaum, “Immigration, refugees, and foreign policy,” International Organization 38:3 (Summer 1984): 429-50.
9.) Ibid, 437-9.
10.) Gil Loescher, “Introduction,” in Refugee and International Relations, ed. Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 12.
11.) Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher, ed. Refugees in International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
12.) Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher, “Refugees in International Relations,” in Refugees in International Relations, ed. Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3.
13.) Jack Snyder, “Realism, Refugees, and Strategies of Humanitarianism,” in Refugees in International Relations, ed. Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 29.
14.) Myron Weiner, “The Clash of Norms – Dilemmas in Refugee Policies,” Journal of Refugee Studies 11:4 (1998): 433.
15.) Snyder, “Realism,” 32.
16.) Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner, Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003).
17.) Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Aid (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005).
18.) See John Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1924); Hans Moregnthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 1948).
19.) “Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva: 1967), accessed August 22, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html.
20.) Charles B. Keely, “How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows,” International Migration Review 30:4 (Winter 1996): 1057.
21.) Loescher, 17.
22.) Ibid.
23.) Betts and Loescher, 9.
24.) Ibid, 2.
25.) Ming Liu, “China and the North Korean Crisis: Facing Test and Transition,” Pacific Affairs 76:3 (2003): 348.
26.) China has exerted 2000 years of influence on Korea. Up until 1910, China carried out the role as a patron under a feudal regime, assisting Korea in the development of its political and cultural civilization. See Debin Zhan, “Chinese People’s Understanding of the Korean Unification Issue,” Asian Social Science 8:3 (2012): 64.
27.) Jian Cai, “The Korea Nuclear Crisis: The Changing Sino-DPRK Relationship,” Asian Perspective 34:1 (2010): 152.
28.) Xiaohe Cheng, “The Evolution of Sino-North Korean Relations in the 1960s,” Asian Perspective 34:2 (2010): 176.
29.) Hyeungkyu Kim, “From a buffer zone to a strategic burden: evolving Sino-North Korea relations during the Hu Jintao era,” The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis 22:1 (2010): 59.
30.) Cheng, 180.
31.) Zhan, 57.
32.) Cheng, 191.
33.) Daniel Goma, “The Chinese-Korean Border Issue: An Analysis of a Contested Frontier,” Asian Survey 46:6 (2006): 875.
34.) Cheng, 191-2.
35.) “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he Chaoxian minzhu zhuyi renmin gongheguo zhengfu lianhe gongbao” (“Joint Communiqué of the People’s Republic and the Governmnet of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”), People’s Daily, April 9th, 1970.
36.) Taekyoon Kim, “Strategizing aid: US-China food aid relations to North Korea in the 1990s,” International Relations of Asia-Pacific 12 (2012): 55.
37.) Kim, “Strategizing aid,” 56.
38.) Liu, 363-4.
39.) China avoided participation in 1994 because Sino-United States and Sino-North Korean relations were at low-points in the 1990s. Following the Tianamen incident in 1989, United States condemned China for its actions and imposed sanctions. Strained Sino-North Korean relations are described above.
40.) Liu, 347.
41.) Kim, “From a buffer zone,” 66.
42.) See Robert Scalapino, “China and Korean reunification – a neighbour’s concerns,” in Korea’s Future and the Great Powers, ed. Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001), 107-124.
43.) Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea (Washington, DC: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011), 30.
44.) Ibid.
45.) Blaine Harden, Escape from Camp 14: One Man’s Remarkable Odyssey from North Korea to Freedom in the West (London: The Penguin Group, 2012), 38.
46.) Keumsoon Lee, The Border-crossing North Koreans: Current Situations and Future Prospects (Korea Institute for National Unification, 2006),10-11.
47.) Ibid, 11.
48.) Human Rights Watch, “The Invisible Exodus: North Korean in the PRC,” November 2002, 14:8 (C), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/northkorea/.
49.) Haggard and Noland, 28.
50.) Fan Bai, “Siwang xianshang zhengzha de beihan xiaonanmin” (“The deathly struggle of North Korean refugees”), Epoch Times, June 14, 2009, accessed August 21, 2012, http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/9/6/12/n2555767.htm.
51.) Human Rights Watch.
52.) “China building North Korea fence,” Taipei Times, October 18, 2006, accessed August 17, 2012, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2006/10/18/2003332245.
53.) Liu, 352.
54.) Human Rights Watch.
55.) Liu, 354.
56.) See Thomas McCarthy,“China and North Korean ‘Refugees’,” Special Report, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network (2002); Liu, 353.
57.) Lee, 41.
58.) Ibid, 42.
59.) Human Rights Watch.
60.) Bai.
61.) Ibid.
62.) Most recently, China is in process of repatriating up to 30 North Koreans who had been arrested. See “Seoul urges China on North Korea refugees,” BBC News, February 22, 2012, accessed August 21, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17123208.
63.) The paper will use the name “Burma” (Union of Burma) until the paper begins to discuss the time period after 2008, the year when the Burma changed its official name to Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
64.) Hongwei Fan, “Sino-Burmese Relations 1949-1953,” in China in the World: Contemporary Issues and Perspectives, ed. Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh and Joanne Hoi-Lee Loh (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of China Studies, 2008), 80.
65.) Ibid, 77.
66.) Michael Charney, “U Nu, China and the ‘Burmese’ Cold War: Propaganda in Burma in the 1950s,” in The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds, ed. Zheng Yangwen, Hong Liu and Michael Szonyi (Boston: Brill, 2010), 42.
67.) Joshua Kurlantzick, “Myanmar: The Next Failed State?” Current History 110:737 (2011): 242.
68.) Norman G. Owen et al., “Burma becomes Myanmar,” in The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia, ed. Norman G. Owen et al. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 500.
69.) N. Ganesan, “Myanmar-China Relations: Interlocking Interests but Independent Output,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 12:1 (2011): 107.
70.) Thant Myint-U, Where China Meets India (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 141.
71.) Ibid, 131.
72.) Ganesan, 107.
73.) Ian Storey, “Emerging Fault Lines in Sino-Burmese Relations: The Kokang Incident,” China Brief 9:18 (2009): 6.
74.) Owen et al., 500.
75.) Myint-U, 51.
76.) Ibid, 52.
77.) Ibid, 51.
78.) Poon Kim Shee, “The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Relations: Strategic and Economic Dimensions,” Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies 1 (2002): 34.
79.) From 1962 to 1988, the Ne Win regime of the Burma Socialist Programme Party dominated and pursued socialist policies to develop the country. However, these policies failed to vitalize the economy, and instead plunged Burma into poverty. The state had to rely on authoritarianism to control its citizens. The legacy of totalitarianism remained and Burma has long been criticized for its human rights abuses. Between 1989-1999, multi-party elections were held. This captured the international community’s attention, as Burmese-born, British-National Aung Yang Suu Kyi returned to Burma to lead the democratic movement. However, when the Democratic Party won the elections, the results were ignored. Popular protests against these actions, known infamously as the 8888 Uprising (on August 8th, 1988), were later violently crushed. The military swept in and established the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Since then, Burma has been in the international limelight for its undemocratic practices and human rights abuses. Consequently, economic, political sanctions and isolation from the international community persisted. Nonetheless, in 2003, General and Prime Minister Khin Nyunt announced a 7-step “roadmap” to “disciplined democracy.”
80.) Owen et al., 504.
81.) Storey, 6.
82.) Kurlantzick, 245.
[83] Bertil Lintner, “Realpolitik and the Myanmar Spring,” Foreign Policy, November 30, 2011, accessed July 24, 2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/30/democracy_myanmar_china_clinton?page=0,1.
84.) Ibid, 2.
85.) Myint-U, 72.
86.) Lintner, 2.
87.) “Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Myanmar Owing to Negative Votes by China, Russia Federation,” United Nations Security Council, last modified January 12, 2007, accessed August 21, 2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8939.doc.htm.
88.) Larry Jagan, “Border war rattles China-Myanmar ties,” Asia Times, September 1, 2009, accessed July 25, 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KI01Ae04.html.
89.) Ibid. Tensions had been building up prior to the attack, as Myanmar troops began to take up positions in the Kokang area in early August. In April 2009, the Burmese government demanded ethnic militias, including the Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), United Wa Sate Army, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), to disarm or to convert into Border Guard Forces under the command of the Tatmadaw. However, these groups rejected these demands, in fear of losing their autonomy and business interests, as the 1989 ceasefire agreements have allowed them to maintain control over their territory. Earlier in August, the three groups, along with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) formed an alliance – the Myanmar Peace and Democracy Front – and agreed to not surrender their arms before elections in 2010. On the other hand, for the Burmese government, the elections gave it incentive to demonstrate military victory and authority across the country. To justify the attack, the government claimed that their operation was a drug raid. Effectively, renewed fighting broke two decades of ceasefire.
90.) T. Fuller, “Refugees Flee to China as Fighting Breaks Out in Myanmar,” New York Times, August 29th, 2009.
91.) “Myanmar fighters cross into China,” Al Jazeera, August 30, 2009, accessed July 25, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2009/08/20098306161918344.html.
92.) Jagan.
93.) Royston Chan, “China tents dismantled as refugees return to Myanmar,” Reuters, September 1, 2009, accessed July 25, 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/09/01/uk-china-myanmar-sb-idUKTRE5800WI20090901.
94.) “Myanmar border inhabitants begin to return from China as situation calms,” Xinhua News, August 30, 2009, accessed July 25, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/30/content_11966205.htm.
95.) Chan.
[96] Tania Branigan, “Burma’s military junta accused of torturing and killing ethnic rebels,” The Guardian, December 18, 2011, accessed July 18, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/18/burma-military-junta-kachin-rebels.
[97] See Jonathan Watts, “Dozens killed in Burma amid clashes over Chinese dams,” The Guardian, June 16, 2011, accessed July 24, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/16/china-burma-hydropower-clashes; “Hydropower Dams Fuelling Conflict in Burma,” Burma Rivers Network, June 15, 2011, accessed July 24, 2012, http://www.burmapartnership.org/2011/06/hydropower-dams-fuelling-conflict-in-burma/.
98.) “Hydropower Dams Fuelling Conflict in Burma.”
99.) James Bourne, “No Assistance for Kachin Refugees,” Radio Free Asia, June 26, 2012, accessed July 19, 2012, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/burma/refugees-06262012165817.html/.
100.) Matthew F. Smith, “Isolated in Yunnan: Kachin Refugees from Burma in China’s Yunnan Province,” Human Rights Watch (June 2012).
[101] Branigan.
[102] Bourne.
[103] “China accused of forcing Burma refugees back to war zone,” The Guardian, June 26, 2012, accessed July 18, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/26/china-accused-returning-burma-refugees.
[104] Htwe Ko, “Chinese authorities push Kachin refugees back into Burma,” Democratic Voice of Burma, July 18, 2012, accessed July 18, 2012, http://www.dvb.no/news/chinese-authorities-push-kachin-refugees-back-into-burma/22870.
105.) “China accused of forcing Burma refugees back to war zone.”
106.) See Jian Chen, “China and the First Indo-China War, 1950-54,” The China Quarterly 133 (1993): 106; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1965 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 6.
107.) Charles Kraus, “A border region ‘exuded with militant friendship’: Provincial narratives of China’s participation in the First Indochina War, 1949-1954,” Cold War History 12:3 (2011): 495. After the First Indochina War, the Geneva Conference held on July 21, 1954 divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel. The north of the parallel was under control of the Viet Minh as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, while the south became the State of Vietnam. As stipulated at the Geneva Conference, this provisional division was to be upheld until nationwide elections are held in 1956.
108.) Jian Chen, “China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69,” The China Quarterly 142 (June 1995): 356.
109.) Ming Guo, Zhong Yue guanxi yanbian sishinian (The Evolution of Sino-Vietnamese Relations over the Past Forty Years) (Nanning, China: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1992), 53.
110.) Chen, “China and the First Indo-China War,” 106.
111.) Ibid, 107-8.
112.) Kosal Path, “The economic factor in the Sino-Vietnamese split, 1972-75: An analysis of Vietnamese archival sources,” Cold War History 11:4 (2011): 519.
113.) Chen, “China’s Involvement,” 358.
114.) Ibid, 359.
115.) Aiguo Qu, “Chinese supporters in the operations to assist Vietnam and resist America” (paper presented at the “International Workshop on New Evidence on China, Southeast Aisa and the Vietnam War,” Hong Kong, January 11-12, 2000): 40.
116.) Chen, “China’s Involvement,” 371.
117.) Ibid, 370.
118.) Ibid, 386.
119.) Path, 522.
120.) First, China was experiencing domestic hardship resulting from the failure of the Cultural Revolution of 1966, which limited China’s capacity to provide the large-scale assistance it was able to before. Second, declining threat from the United States led to President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. Third, after the Sino-Soviet split, containing Soviet influence in the region became tantamount. It was thus essential to pull Vietnam away from Soviet’s orbit of influence.
121.) Path, 529.
122.) Ibid, 530.
123.) Xiaoming Zhang, “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment,” The China Quarterly 184 (December 2005): 855.
124.) Path, 540.
125.) John C. Donnell, “Vietnam 1979: Year of Calamity,” Asian Survey 20:1 (1980): 22.
126.) Zhang, 865.
127.) Ibid, 853.
128.) Ibid, 867.
129.) Barry Wain, “The Indochina Refugee Crisis,” Foreign Affairs 58:1 (1979): 161.
130.) Hungdah Chiu, “China’s Legal Position on Protecting Chinese Residents in Vietnam,” The American Journal of International Law 74:3 (1980): 685.
131.) Wain, 163.
132.) Ibid, 163-4.
133.) Donnell, 27.
134.) Wain, 171.
135.) Ibid, 164.
136.) Ibid, 172.
137.) “Refugees of Rhetoric Victims in a neighbourly conflict,” Time Magazine 112:6, August 7, 1978, 52.
138.) Wain, 166.
139.) Shouyi Fan, trans., “Jilaizhi, zeanzhi: 20 wan yuenan nanmin zai zhongguo shengcun diaocha” (Now that they have come, we must help them settle down: an investigation of the living conditions of 200,000 Vietnamese refugees in China), China Academic Journal Electronic Publishing House 12 (2007): 15. Office of UNHCR “highly acclaimed the Chinese government’s efforts to make arrangements for settling the refugees in China,” and stated that the “placement of Vietnamese refugees within its borders is one of the most successful models for settlement of refugees.”
140.) Tom Lam, “The Exodus of Hoa Refugees from Vietnam and their Settlement in Guangxi: China’s Refugee Settlement Strategies,” Journal of Refugee Studies 13:4 (2000): 378.
141.) Ibid.
142.) Ibid.
143.) Ibid, 379.
144.) Ibid, 389.
145.) Ibid, 384-386.
146.) “North Koreans in China: UNHCR asks for access,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, last modified January 21, 2003, accessed August 16, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/3e2d3f98f.html.
147.) “Trade with Countries and Regions in Asia (2010/01-04),” Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, last modified May 26, 2010, accessed August 16, 2012, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/statistic/lanmubb/ASEAN/201005/20100506934001.html.
148.) Ibid.
149.) C. Y. Chang, “Overseas Chinese in China’s Policy,” The China Quarterly 82 (June 1980): 283.
150.) Chiu, 688.
151.) See “Kim Jong-un meets with senior Chinese officials,” The Telegraph, August 3, 2012, accessed August 16, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9448404/Kim-Jong-un-meets-with-senior-Chinese-officials.html; “North Korea’s Kim Jong-un may be planning first China trip,” The Telegraph, July 31, 2012, accessed August 16, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9440146/North-Koreas-Kim-Jong-un-may-be-planning-first-China-trip.html.
152.) “Situation of human rights in Myanmar,” United Nations General Assembly, last modified March 13, 2007, accessed August 21, 2012, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/508/29/PDF/N0650829.pdf?OpenElement.
153.) Ganesan, 105.
154.) Ibid, 97.
155.) Betts and Loescher, “Refugees in International Relations,” 9.
156.) “23.6 Refugee and Asylee Adjustment under Section 209 of the Act,” United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, last modified June 21, 2006, accessed August 22, 2012, http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-8624/0-0-0-9785.html.
