Since the attacks of September 11th, the Western world has labeled al-Qaeda and its leadership as suicidal and irrational terrorists hating the Western 'way of life'. This justified the American "War on Terror" and led Margaret Thatcher to declare Islam the new Communism. However, as is often pointed out, what is 'terrorism' in the view of one may be mere 'warfare' in the view of another. It is therefore important to avoid these terms and answer the question of cost-benefit rationality. Social movement theory provides a useful framework for interpreting al-Qaeda. Can social movement theory help focus on the crucial questions of why and how the organization emerged and what caused the change in the organizational mode leading to today's structure? To what extent can social movement theory describe al-Qaeda's development and where does it reach its boundaries?
In order to analyze the development of al-Qaeda, various scholars have pursued the application of social movement theory over the past ten years. The dominance of Western scholars in social movement theory and the perception that Islamism is somewhat exceptional led for a long time to the exclusion of generally non-Western movements and specifically Islamic movements. While applying social movement theory to e.g. Hamas none of the authors have gone as far as to include al-Qaeda. Hafez studied Islamic movements mostly in Northern Africa and tried to produce a universal assumption aiming "to explain as many instances of Muslim rebellions as possible" and suggested solutions. This by definition generalizes and simplifies specific components on the small basis of few examples.
Peter Arnett interviewing Osama bin Laden in 1997
"We believe the United States is directly responsible for those who were killed in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq. This American government abandoned humanitarian feelings by these hideous crimes. ... The United States today has set a double standard ... It wants to occupy our countries, steal our resources, impose on us agents to rule us … and wants us to agree to all this. If we refuse to do so, it will say, 'You are terrorists'."
Osama bin Laden
Interview with Peter Arnett.
Therefore, this essay builds on existing findings and applies them to al-Qaeda, the organization which seems to be least associated with social movement. The analysis largely excludes the various regional branches of al-Qaeda and concentrates instead on the core of the organization which is nowadays called al-Qaeda or mother al-Qaeda and which historically revolves around the ideological leader Osama bin Laden. As a theory describing groups of actors, social movement theory provides us with the appropriate level of analysis to describe this component within the overall al-Qaeda network.
First, an overview of social movement theory and its historical roots is undertaken. The next section briefly traces back the development of al-Qaeda and its evolution from a hierarchical to a largely decentralized organization. It then applies social movement theory to the source data to determine the degree of usefulness. Furthermore, shifting the level of analysis to an individual level, it provides an outlook for further research based on a bottom-up approach to fill the explanatory gaps identified within social movement theory.
The source data consists of internal al-Qaeda documents released by 'The National Security Archive' on the basis of the Freedom of Information Act and on the so called 'Letters from Abbottabad'. This is a valuable basis for the analysis since it provides insight into the plans and intentions of al-Qaeda's leadership. Arguably, the evidence presented is limited, but preliminary assumptions can be made which can serve as a starting point for further debate and research.
Social movement theory is a concept developed since the 1960s. It is based on the idea of individuals forming networks and focuses on the reasons for the creation of these networks as well as on the means of mobilization of previously uninvolved individuals.
A social movement is according to Diani "a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity". This identity creates solidarity and makes the network internally homogeneous while functioning as a distinctive characteristic towards out-groups.
This section will describe the four major trends of social movement theory:
- Mass behavior
- Resource mobilization theory
- Political opportunity processes
- New social movements (NSM)
The latter three emphasize the idea of 'knowledgeable subjects'. They assume rational actors, which each perform cost-benefit calculations and join social movements in order to maximize own benefits. Although this definition has not been accepted by all social movements, some preferring an altruistic activist image, it is generally applied in the literature. Another important differentiation made is the question of whether change is promoted at systemic or non-systemic (individual) level. Accordingly, authors differ in the way that they on the one hand take into account a systemic political perspective (Tilly, McCarthy, Zald) or on the other hand address both cultural and personal change of individuals (Melucci and Turner/Killian).
Even though this has been stressed by some authors an overly strong differentiation of social movements from political and social organizations (e.g. parties or religious sects) and from informal networks such as political mobilization campaigns seems to supply us with no added benefit. Given the definition of social movements as including both individuals and organizations, I consider it unfavorable to exclude political formations 'per se' as this would e.g. exclude Hamas from the social movement towards Palestinian self-determination. I therefore disagree with the statement of Diani, as especially in fascist parties in Italy and Germany prior to WWII ideology was one important part of political discourse.
The concept of social movement theory analyses individuals performing collective actions towards common interests. These actions are mostly displayed outside of common institutional frameworks such as the political space granted by governments and need not be visible (e.g. demonstrations).
The following briefly highlights the main characteristics of each strand of social movement theory. On this basis section 3 examines al-Qaeda's development and suggests to what extent social movement theory is helpful in describing al-Qaeda.
The core idea is that "mass behavior is derived from functionalism 'equilibrium in systems'" and that there is a direct causal relationship between structural and psychological preconditions (such as discomfort or social despair) and so called 'crowd processes'.
Blumer and Canetti make references to nature's passive processes such as wildfires or avalanches, which are caused by natural events and not by active, rational decisions. Accordingly, collective behavior is unrelated to 'organizational' or 'institutional' structures.
In contrast to the mentioned passive processes, the following three strands focus on rational actors making conscious decisions to join a social movement. These are more applicable in describing al-Qaeda.
McCarthy et al. stress the importance of resource mobilization in the formation of social movements. Edwards and McCarthy define resources as required by social movements in terms of their moral, cultural, social-organizational, human or material dimensions. The four means of accessing additional resources are seen as main reasons for forming movements: aggregation of existing resources, self-production, appropriation by e.g. linking existing social movement's websites and patronage e.g. using respected figures or recognized awards.
Resource mobilization theorists see a flexible and fluid but nevertheless hierarchical structure, which is a clear distinction towards mass behavior. Since involving both administrative and logistical challenges, formal social movement organizations (SMO) gain importance, which can provide continuity and extend the reach of social movements. These SMOs as well as individual actors take over the important role of 'movement entrepreneurs' that will be described below.
'Political processes' is closely associated with Tilly. He defines social movements as organized and sustained, but in addition adds the characteristics 'self-conscious' thereby highlighting the "challenge which implies shared identity among participants".
Analogous to resource mobilization theory, Tilly describes rational actors, who act with the goal of starting a "political process, where excluded interests try to get access to the established polity". Thus, social movements to him primarily originate within a certain country in opposition to the government. Although specifically containing the word political, such processes always encompass one or multiple cultural, economic or social factors.
A second important focus for Tilly is on processes. Social movements to him are a "sustained series of interactions between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support."
These interactions will change according to opportunities and constraints provided by the system. For example the access to political space and decision-making may vary over time on the basis of the political system's current openness or prevailing coalitions. While recognizing the influence of movement entrepreneurs, 'political process' theorists will explain a social movement's behavior mostly by structural factors of the system.
Whereas the previous three approaches concentrate primarily on the 'how' of social movements' creation, certain authors such as Melucci and Touraine seek to explain the 'why' of movement creation. Furthermore, they analyze narratives used to increase popular support of individuals. This approach seeks to understand the underlying "large-scale structural and cultural changes".
It focuses on the concept of 'framing', originated in psychology and sociology and aimed at creating a common vision within a social movement. Frames serve as mental filters strongly influencing the interpretation of events and the world as a whole. "Frames are tools that lend order and sense to an otherwise confusing world by providing language that captures or constructs the meaning of prOsama bin Ladenems." The frame is then applied by individuals to future events and therefore has to encompass multiple dimensions. As Goffman puts it, frames are constructed along biological (e.g. age or gender) or cultural and social (e.g. religion, language, profession) outlines.
Whereas Touraine develops the idea of one core conflict which draws people together with subordinate ones possibly adding to the broader picture, Melucci is less interested in the single core conflict.
He provides us instead with a definition of social movements along three dimensions:
- Solidarity at the center of social movements
- Requires conflict and an opposition (adversary) claiming the same goods or values
- Goals cannot be achieved within existing system, but there is a necessity to break the boundaries imposed
This aligns with the three core tasks of framing identified by Snow and Benford.
In summary, the goal therefore is to alter an existing, intolerable system. However, activity of social movements cannot be measured solely according to visible and public actions, but instead has to take into account e.g. cultural production. Touraine also recognizes the, as he puts it, "combination of a principle of identity, a principle of opposition and a principle of totality", which enables social actors to identify themselves as well as their conflict opponents and the stakes. The central idea of both terms 'solidarity' and '(group) identity' is the creation of a joint ideology, a joint set of beliefs and sense of belonging. Movement entrepreneurs (possibly individuals or institutions) use and encourage the spread of 'ideological framing' and 'meaning construction'. Movement entrepreneurs are seen as a requirement for enduring social movements by creating a collective identity based on solidarity and a sense of (in-)justice.
As the previous section has argued major differences between the different strands of theory exist. Nevertheless, every author offers valuable insights into social movements to an extent that helps analyze al-Qaeda by focusing on the "circulation of essential for action (information, expertise, material resources)" as well as giving meaning by narrowly creating an identity. Theories can thereby help analyze and understand the creation of conditions for mobilization (e.g. resource mobilization theory) as well as the ideological background. This is the aim of the following section, which makes claims about al-Qaeda suggesting historical evidence.Continued on Next Page »
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Endnotes
1.) (Bergen 2001, 19) as cited in (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 51)
2.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, I)
3.) Cf. (Thatcher 2002): "Islamic extremism today, like Bolshevism in the past, is an armed doctrine. It is an aggressive ideology promoted by fanatical, well-armed devotees. And, like Communism, it requires an all-embracing long-term strategy to defeat it."
4.) Cf. (Aljazeera 2012)
5.) Cf. (Bayat 2005), (Kurzman 2003) or (Wiktorowicz 2002)
6.) (Hafez 2003)
7.) "Letters from Abbottabad" refers to 17 declassified documents captured in the Abbottabad raid on Osama bin Laden on 2 May 2011 which were released to and by the Combating Terrorism Centre (CTC) at West Point (http://www.ctc.usma.edu)
8.) Cf. (Kurzman 2003, 46)
9.) Cf. (Peterson 1989, 419): Distinctions are made between the American school with authors such as McCarthy, Tilly or Zald focussing on the mobilization and especially 'recruiting' processes and the European school with authors such as Touraine and Melucci focussing on how social prOsama bin Ladenems lead to the creation of social movements.
10.) (Diani 1992, 13)
11.) Cf. (Diani 1992, 3-4)
12.) Cf. (Diani 1992, 10-11)
13.) Cf. (Diani 1992, 17)
14.) Cf. (Diani 1992, 13): "In contrast to what happens in social movements, interaction in coalitions does not foster the emergence of collective identities, nor does it imply necessarily any sort of continuity beyond the limits of the specific conflictual situation, let alone a global redefinition of the issues at stake."
15.) Cf. (Tilly, From Mobilization To Revolution 1977, '1-11')
16.) Cf. (Wiktorowicz 2002, 191-192)
17.) Cf. (Canetti 1963, 285)
18.) Cf. (Diani 1992, 3-4)
19.) Cf. (Diani 1992, 3)
20.) Cf. (Edwards and McCarthy 2004, 132-133)
21.) Cf. (Wiktorowicz 2002, 196)
22.) Cf. (Diani 1992, 4, 7)
23.) (Tilly, Social Movements and national politics 1984, 303)
24.) (Diani 1992, 5)
25.) (Tilly, Social Movements and national politics 1984, 306)
26.) Cf. (Hafez 2003, 28)
27.) (Diani 1992, 5)
28.) Cf. (Goffman 1986, 1-40)
29.) (Okruhlik 2004, 251)
30.) Cf. (Goffman 1986, 1-40)
31.) Cf. (Diani 1992, 6)
32.) Cf. (Melucci 1989, 29)
33.) Cf. (Snow and Benford 1988) as quoted in (Wiktorowicz 2002, 202): 1. Identify prOsama bin Ladenematic condition and target to blame; 2. Supply a solution; 3. Turn 'bystanders into participants' by motivating support,
34.) Cf. (Diani 1992, 6)
35.) (Touraine 1981, 81) as quoted in (Diani 1992, 6)
36.) Cf. (Diani 1992, 8), Cf. (Wiktorowicz 2002, 202) and cf. (Kurzman 2003, 289)
37.) Cf. (Okruhlik 2004, 257)
38.) (Diani 1992, 7)
39.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 48)
40.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 49)
41.) Cf. (The National Security Archive, The Taliban Biography 2009) and cf. (U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) 1998, 5)
42.) Cf. (The National Security Archive, The Osama Bin Laden File 2011)
43.) Cf. (The National Security Archive 2008): Taliban Commander Mullah Omar publicly stated that the Taliban "will never hand over bin Laden to anyone and (will) protect him with our blood at all costs."
44.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 57) and cf. (al-Zawahiri 2005): e.g. urging to ignore Shiite-Sunni differences
45.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 45-47): The name is also transliterated as Ayman al-Dhawahiri.
46.) Own figure after (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 48)
47.) Cf. (Lawrence 2011)
48.) Cf. (CIA 1996, 2)
49.) Cf. (Lichtblau and Schmitt 2010): Information based on internal emails released by Wikileaks (www.wikileaks.org)
50.) Cf. (National Security Council, Strategy for Elimating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status and Prospects 2001, 1)
51.) Cf. (CIA 1996, 2)
52.) Cf. (CIA 1996, 1)
53.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 48)
54.) Cf. (CIA 1996, 1)
55.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 47): Osama bin Laden invested an estimated 300m US$ in road works and construction in Sudan through his own construction company in return for receiving shelter,
56.) Cf. (National Security Council, Strategy for Elimating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status and Prospects 2001, 2)
57.) Cf. (CIA 1996, 1)
58.) Cf. (National Security Council, Strategy for Elimating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status and Prospects 2001, 4)
59.) Cf. (Lawrence 2011)
60.) Cf. (Classified 2003, 2, 18)
61.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 45-47)
62.) Cf. (Classified 2003, 18)
63.) Cf. (Farrall 2011, 129)
64.) Cf. (National Security Council, Strategy for Elimating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status and Prospects 2001, 1)
65.) Own figure based on the categories of (Edwards and McCarthy 2004, 132-133)
66.) Cf. (Oberschall, Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests, and Identities 1995, chapter 1)
67.) (National Security Council, Strategy for Elimating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status and Prospects 2001, 1-2)
68.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 53)
69.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 48): By creating the so called 'Encyclopaedia of the Jihad' in 1996 and on CD in 1999, training of surveillance and interrogation, guerrilla tactics and weapons like explosives was provided.
70.) Own figure after (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 54)
71.) Cf. (M.-M. Mohamedou 2011, 33-35)
72.) Cf. (Farrall 2011)
73.) Cf. (National Security Council, Memorandum for Condoleezza Rice: Presidential Policy Initiative/Review - The Al-Qida Network 2001, 2)
74.) Cf. (Richter 1999, 388)
75.) Cf. (Oberschall, Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory 2004, 28-29)
76.) Cf. (O. Bin Laden 2006) and(O. Bin Laden 2004) as printed in (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 98-111)
77.) Cf. (Fattah 2006)
78.) Cf. (Shadid 2002, 176)
79.) Cf. (CIA Classified 2001, 1)
80.) Cf. (M.-M. Mohamedou 2011, 24): Al-Qaeda in Iraq for example had to replace three of its leaders in four years: Abu Musab al Zarqawi (killed on 8 June 2006), Abu Hamza al Mouhajir (killed on 18 April 2010), Abu Omar al Baghdadi (killed on 18 April 2010).
81.) Cf. (Hafez 2003, 111) and cf. (Pargeter 2008, 129-131)
82.) Cf. (al-Zawahiri 2005)
83.) Cf. (EurActiv, EurActiv.com 2011) and cf. (EurActiv, EurActiv.com 2012)
84.) Cf. (O. Bin Laden, SOCOM-2012-0000019-HT 2010, 5)
85.) Cf. (McCants 2011, 32)
86.) Also referred to as 'Pax Americana'
87.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 8): According to the US Defence Department there have been 17 military operations between 1980 and 1995.
88.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 9-10) and cf. (O. Bin Laden, Your Security Is In Your Hands 2004) as printed in (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 101-107) and (Bergen 2001, 19,21) as quoted in (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 51)
89.) Cf. (Hoffman 1993, 12)
90.) Cf. (Shadid 2002, 56-63)
91.) Cf. (McCants 2011, 23)
92.) Cf. (al-Amriki 2004) as quoted in (IntelCenter 2004, 14-19)
93.) Cf. (US Department of State 1998, 2)
94.) Cf. (CIA Classified 2001)
95.) Cf. Islamic Liberation Army of the People of Kenya as quoted in (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 52): "Americans humiliate our people, they have occupied the Arabian Peninsula, they extract our riches, they enforce a blockade, and they support Israel, our archenemy who occupies the Al Aqsa mosque."
96.) Cf. (Bayat 2005)
97.) (O. Bin Laden, A Discussion on the New Crusader Wars 2001)
98.) (Lawrence 2011, 389)
99.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 88)
100.) (M.-M. Mohamedou 2011, 9)
101.) Cf. (al-Zawahiri 2005)
102.) Cf. (American al-Qaeida spokesman Adam Gadahn 2011, 6-8): Catholics are describes as having been sympathetic to the Muslim cause and therefore attacking them in Iraq "does not help … convey the message."
103.) Cf. (O. Bin Laden, SOCOM-2012-0000016 unknown date, 3-10): "Al-Qaida concentrates on its external big enemy before its internal enemy."
104.) Cf. (American al-Qaeida spokesman Adam Gadahn 2011, 5-9): The chapter "Showing the fairness of our case" goes into large detail to describe and criticize the effect that different attacks have had on the perception of al-Qaeda and cf. (al-Hasan (Atiyya) and al-Libi 2010, 1-2)
105.) Cf. (American al-Qaeida spokesman Adam Gadahn 2011): "We refuse to attribute these crimes to Qa'ida al-Jihad Organization. If it is to be proven that those responsible for it are connected with the organization, the organization will take the appropriate measures towards them."
106.) Cf. (O. Bin Laden, SOCOM-2012-0000019-HT 2010, 3, 15): "We are now in a new phase of assessing Jihad activities and developing them beyond what they were in the past in two areas, military activity and media releases. Our work in these two areas is broad and sweeping, encompassing the headquarters and regional areas." and "We are in need of an advisory reading, with constructive criticism to our entire policy and publications at the center and in the regions internally."
107.) Cf. (M.-M. Mohamedou 2011, 30)
108.) Cf. (American al-Qaeida spokesman Adam Gadahn 2011, 1-5) and (O. Bin Laden, SOCOM-2012-0000016 unknown date, 18): "We need to understand that a huge part of the battle is the media."
109.) Cf. (M.-M. Mohamedou 2011, 30,32)
110.) (Zald and Ash Garner 1987/1966, 125-126)
111.) (Oberschall 1995, 67) as quoted in (Hafez 2003, 110)
112.) Cf. (O. Bin Laden, SOCOM-2012-0000019-HT 2010, 31): e.g. "It would be nice if you would nominate one of the qualified brothers to be responsible for a large operation in the US."
113.) (Lahoud 2012, 102): Analysis of Fadil Harun's (al-Qaeda's 'confidential secretary' since 1998) two-volume autobiography.
114.) Cf. (Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century 2008)
115.) Cf. (Bakker 2011)
116.) Cf. (Oberschall, Theories of Social Conflict 1978, 293)
117.) Cf. (Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks 2004, 183): Sageman suggest the secret observation of individuals as well as intercepting phone calls which may violate basic human rights and may well prove counterproductive.
118.) Cf. (Classified 2003)
119.) Cf. (Lianos, Conflict as Closure 2011, 4)
120.) Cf. (Oberschall, Social Movements and the Transition to Democracy 2000, 28) and cf, (Oberschall, Theories of Social Conflict 1978, 292): These four dimensions are seen as necessary for the rise of social movements and their turn to violence: (1) dissatisfaction, (2) ideology, (3) the capacity to mobilize and (4) political opportunity. Oberschall argues that within e.g. a highly authoritarian regime collective action becomes difficult and highly unlikely and strong social movements will rise when these regimes are (even temporarily) weakened.
121.) Cf. (Shadid 2002, 120-142)
122.) Cf. (Barnes 1926, 315): "I hold it, that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical. It is a medicine necessary for the sound health of government."
123.) (Lianos, Conflict as Change 2012, 14)
124.) Cf. (Tilly, From Mobilization To Revolution 1977, 6-25)
125.) Cf. (Lianos, Conflict as Change 2012, 7)
126.) Cf. (Lianos, Conflict as Closure 2011, 9-19)
127.) Cf. (Lianos, Conflict as Change 2012, 14-15) and (Lianos, Conflict as Closure 2011, 11)
128.) Cf. (Lianos, Conflict as Change 2012, 3-5)
129.) Cf. (Gurr 1971, chapter 2)
130.) (Pargeter 2008, 112-113, 175)
131.) Cf. (Opp 2009)
132.) Cf. (Eschle 2001)
133.) Cf. (The Associated Press 2009)
134.) Cf. (O. Bin Laden, SOCOM-2012-0000019-HT 2010, 16): "[C]ommitting to the general lines, designed according to the Shari'ah policy in our Jihadist operations and our media publications is an extremely important issue; it will achieve, God willing, great gains for the Jihadist movement – most importantly gain the crowds of the nation, correct the wrong impressions in the minds of the Mujahidin."
135.) (al-Zawahiri 2005): Reference to the need for democratic processes in Iraq with a possible al-Qaeda government participation
136.) Arabic: 'Maktab al Khadamat lil Mujahideen al Arab' or 'Maktab al Dhiyafa'
137.) Cf. (Roy 2011, 20): Mostly from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq and Pakistan
138.) Arabic: 'Beit al Ansar'
139.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 48-53)
140.) Cf. (National Security Council, Strategy for Elimating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status and Prospects 2001, 2); Includes: The Palestinian Asbat al-Ansar and the Chechnyan Mujaheedin.
141.) Cf. (M.-M. O. Mohamedou 2006, 57-58); The eleven countries are Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Tunisia, the UK and Yemen.
142.) Own figure
