The Political Rationality of Terror: Understanding Terrorism as the Result of Organizational Goal-Seeking

Hamas

An offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas grew as an immediate response to the intifada, capitalizing on the population’s need for violence to express its grievances. Hamas participated in the violence that was spreading to capture Palestinian support for its organization. The Muslim Brothers recognized the intifada as the perfect timing to harvest popular support through the use of violence. Hamas’s leadership was politically active in the Territories in forming a social system from the 1970s, before Hamas was founded. This aided their political legitimacy given that the reasons the intifada erupted were mostly about Palestinian poor socioeconomic status. Hamas’s leadership operated for a decade in near silence, focusing on social grievances of Palestinians. However, to establish their terrorist organization and achieve their organizational goals, Hamas’s founders used violence as rhetoric. In a time in which popular support for violence for strategic proposes was subsiding, the intifada facilitated an opportunity for the establishment of Hamas. Due to the Fatah-led PLO’s supremacy in the Territories, Hamas’s opportunity to pose a potential threat to Fatah was through the use of violence. As the dominant terrorist organization in the Territories and Israel, Hamas became a valid threat to the PLO.

Growth of Hamas

Hamas used violence to undermine Fatah and draw support. After Arafat began secret negotiations with Israel, his ability to embrace violence was depleted. His constituencies, so he thought, supported a political process that they did not know was in the works. This allowed Hamas to use violence to delegitimize Fatah and the PLO. However, after the 1991 Madrid Conference, as negotiations with Israel became known, the Fatah-Hamas dispute turned to an ideological battle over constituents. In 1991, Hamas inflicted violence on Palestinian collaborators in an attempt to weaken support for Fatah and its moderate methods. Hamas quickly realized that such activities were counterproductive to rallying popular support among Palestinians. Piazza discusses this effect in his discussion about targeting civilians that constituents could relate to.39 To appease broader constituencies, after December 1991 Hamas focused on Israeli targets.

During the Oslo procedure, Hamas used terrorism to undermine the peace process, backed by Palestinian lack of faith in the process and Arafat. Throughout the 1990s, Hamas’s terrorist campaigns were the organization’s attempts to undermine Arafat, and legitimize Hamas. The organization launched campaigns aimed at sabotaging Arafat’s peace processes with Israel. These were intended to delegitimize the PLO while delegitimizing the PLO’s strategy of negotiations, as well. International partners could see that Arafat cannot obtain monopoly on the use of violence in the PA, and doubt his capabilities to adhere to any agreement signed. These doubts would interrupt political processes. Hamas would use that to argue that Arafat, Fatah, and the PLO cannot deliver their strategic objective vis-à-vis peaceful means, and that the only way to advance the Palestinian plight is through the use of violence. Furthermore, Israeli retaliation to the violence of radical movements such as Hamas “[made] Hamas’s rhetoric appear valid and prescient.”40

The majority of the Palestinian population in the Territories did not support terrorism, and Hamas was struggling to pose a significant threat to Arafat’s supremacy. Immediately after Oslo, Arafat suppressed Hamas’s influence in the Territories mostly vis-à-vis arrests. Following the 1996 elections, in which Arafat was elected president, the PLO had established its legitimate dominance in the Territories. This was accompanied by a general belief in the peace process among Palestinians, which was also accompanied by a Palestinian disapproval of terrorism.41 At this point, Hamas had suffered from very low support among Palestinians, mostly because its rhetoric did not resonate with the masses, which was shown by very low terrorist activity by Hamas.42

In 1999, Hamas’s luck has started to change in a way that was directly correlated with Palestinian popular support. Hamas openly recognized Arafat’s legitimacy and the legitimacy of the PA. While this move drew criticism from Hamas’s radical constituencies, it appeased the moderates, and thus broadened Hamas’s support among Palestinians. In 2000, Palestinians had started to doubt Arafat, the PLO, and the peace process. In the same year, Arafat had rejected the Barak Plan, the most generous proposal Israel had ever made in terms of territory it was willing to give the PA. Coupled with deteriorating socioeconomic conditions that some Palestinians felt Arafat failed in addressing, Arafat’s refusal of the Barak Plan intensified Palestinians’ lack of faith in Arafat and his capabilities of advancing their strategic goals. As the second intifada erupted in late 2000, Hamas emerged as a leading power again. Since Hamas was still recovering from its most devastating period, suicide terrorism proved to be the best and only tactic to advance its organizational goals, mostly because Palestinian popular support for violence increased. Via terrorism Hamas was able to raise its profile to the international community, legitimizing its cause and drawing capital. The perceived failure of legitimate political channels led Palestinians to believe that violence was the only choice. This repeating notion of violence as the only choice resonated with the Palestinian public as Hamas adopted it to mobilize support.

There is a direct correlation between the Palestinian population’s faith in the peace process and their support for terrorism. Similarly, there is a direct correlation between Palestinian support for violence and Hamas’s use of terrorism. Palestinian public opinion polls show that in 2001 most Palestinians had faith in negotiations while supporting armed struggle as an alternative.43 However, these polls point to a trend between 2000 and 2001 in which support largely shifted from Arafat and diplomacy towards Hamas and violence. Figure 1 shows public support for violence against Israeli civilians between 1994-2005. Figure 2 shows the number of terrorist activities of Fatah/PLO and Hamas between those years. When the Palestinian people believed peace is feasible, they opposed terrorism as means for achieving strategic goals, and terrorism did not happen. Hamas was unable to mobilize popular support vis-à-vis terrorism because people were opposed to it. In times when the Palestinian public was losing faith in the negotiations and peace process, Hamas embarked on its most active campaign of terrorism.

Organizational vs. Strategic Goals

Hamas used terrorism and violence to advance their organization as rival to Fatah, and not as a way to further their ambitious political aspiration against Israel. As Bloom notices, “Hamas’s leadership realized that militant activities and terror would not bring about their long-term goals, and so they devised long-term strategies and tactics.”44 Bloom further explains that should the Palestinian public show its dismay of terrorism, Hamas would have to reconsider its use of it.45 Hamas, like Fatah, recognized that terrorism would not promote its strategic goals, but it is Hamas’s best way to advance its organizational goals. Further, once Hamas’s leadership would notice that terrorism becomes ineffective in advancing its goals, it would revisit the decision to use terrorism. In allowing the desertion of terrorism to be an option, Hamas was attempting to appeal to the moderate factions of the Territories, Fatah’s constituents. Hamas’s decision regarding the use of terrorism was guided by popular support.

Rising Support for Violence

After 2005 Palestinian started losing faith in diplomatic measures, and support for violence gradually rose, more so in Gaza than in the West Bank. With the rise in support for violence, Hamas engaged in more terrorist activity. Polls conducted in November and December of 2005 show that in Gaza, more than in the West Bank, Palestinians saw “suicide bombings [as] necessary to force Israel to make concessions.”46 While general support for violence was on the rise, it was more noticeable in Gaza, which accompanied a greater support for Hamas in Gaza than in the West Bank. The same polls showed that of all grievances, Palestinians cared the most about prisoners’ release, more than twice as they did about job creation and other economic hardships.47 Between December 2005 and June 2006, overall support for peaceful agreements subsided.48 While Hamas’s use of terrorism was on the rise in 2006, on June 25 of that year Hamas had abducted the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

Hamas and the PLO/Fatah

Similar to most terrorist organizations, both Fatah and Hamas used terrorism to launch their organization. They had two different levels of objectives, organizational and strategic. Both adopted a strategic goal of liberating Palestinian territory from Israel for the establishment of a Palestinian state in its place. Both organizations recognized that terrorism would not advance these objectives, but it could serve to mobilize people. As such, both organizations used terrorism to advance their organizational goals of legitimizing their organization and cause, rallying the masses to support the cause and the organization, recruit, finance their operations, and counter competition from rival factions. Differences begin with the outbreak of the first intifada.

Fatah/PLO, after years of anticipation for an opportunity to advance its strategic goals via legitimate political channels, ceased the opportunity to negotiate with the US and Israel. Fatah had already established its legitimacy, and was striving to advance its strategic objectives. The PLO had increased its bargaining power and was waiting for the opportunity to capitalize. Once the timing was right, and Arafat was presented with an opportunity for negotiations at a time in which public opinion generally supported peaceful means, the PLO had started its process of disengaging from terrorism. Hamas, on the other hand, was in its genesis. It used the uprising to use violence in a way that would advance its organizational objectives. Having a moderate PLO aided in the process. Hamas focused on terrorism to advance organization objectives.

Following the first intifada (uprising) in 1987, a generational cleavage divided Palestinian constituents along support for diplomacy and support for continuation of the armed struggle.49 The aftermath of the intifada brought the Fatah-led PLO closer to political participation with Israel and the US, while also generating the growth of the Islamist Hamas. Since the PLO gained access to diplomatic measures and Hamas did not, constituents supporting peaceful processes followed the PLO while those who favored violence supported Hamas. After 1995, with the adherence of the PLO to the Oslo agreements, popular support for violence meant larger support for Hamas and more terrorist activity, while popular support for legitimate political procedures meant higher approval ratings for the PLO.

After the signing of Oslo II in 1995, Palestinian terrorism was an outcome of Palestinian popular support for terrorism. When the population believed in peaceful means, the PLO/Fatah was in control, and no terrorism had been used. Conversely, in times when the public lost faith in these processes, Hamas became more influential and launched many terrorist campaigns.

The most significant time is after the second intifada. The Palestinian public generally supports martyrdom and terrorism, but the PLO still does not engage in terrorism. This has to do with Fatah’s constituents as much as it has to do with the PLO’s commitment to an unarmed engagement internationally. This suggests that once an organization has made the transition into legitimate political means, as long as there is some percentage of support, even if it is not the majority, the organization would persist in peaceful means and not succumb back to terrorism.

Alternative Explanations

Conventional wisdom trying to identify the circumstances under which terrorism stops focus on the immediate, rather than analyzing the organizations’ perspective regarding the efficacy of terrorist activity in promoting their objectives. One conventional wisdom, promoted by Robert Pape, considers concessions and the achievement of goals as the reason groups stop using terrorism. Concessions generally prove to the organization that terrorism is effective in coercing state actors. Another conventional wisdom argues that terrorism stops as a result of counterterrorism efforts as they diminish the organization’s capabilities. This explanation, too, fails to recognize that the organization’s determination persists. Thus, once the organization recuperates, terrorism will continue. Generally, contemporary scholarship focuses on the immediate circumstances when trying to explain terrorism cessation.

Some scholars argue that terrorism stops once the organization’s goals are achieved. These scholars focus on the ways in which terrorism advances an organization’s strategic goals – its political agenda. Robert Pape substantiates his argument that terror works on concessions made by a target state in direct response to terror campaigns, specifically Israel and Hamas in the mid 1990s.50 From his arguments, two conclusions can be drawn: (1) when terrorist organizations achieve a goal, they reduce or stop their use of terrorism, but (2) as they see that terrorism works, they will use such tactics in the future to further coerce a state until their demands are fully answered. Audrey Kurth Cronin recognizes the African National Congress (ANC) and other organizations as not only forsaking terrorist tactics, but also deceasing as terrorist organization once achieved all of their goals.51 As such, while concessions might halt singular campaigns, they will only promote groups to focus on terrorism as a coercive strategy in the long run due to its effectiveness.

This line of thought would predict less terrorist activity by Hamas or Fatah in response to Israeli concessions. In the case of Hamas and its mid 1990s campaigns aimed at coercing Israel to adhere to the timeline agreed in the Oslo agreements and withdraw from territories, while Hamas stopped its campaigns in response to Israeli withdrawals, Hamas did not forsake terrorist tactics at large. Similarly, after the Israeli unilateral disengagement from the Gaza strip in 2005, Pape should predict terrorism would stop. However, in 2006 it only intensified. In both cases of Fatah and Hamas the data show the organizations used terrorism to advance their organizational goals, not strategic.

Other conventional wisdoms believe that when terrorism becomes too costly, groups may forgo such tactics until such costs subside. Counterterrorism efforts can make it harder for groups to launch terrorist campaigns, and groups might cease terror operations when they become too costly. Counterterrorism operations, however, have two effects: while diminishing the group’s capabilities, they also strengthen it by bringing attention to its cause and increasing its willingness to retaliate. Mia Bloom argues that each terrorist operation magnifies the organization’s support and number of operatives52. As such, counterterrorism both stops the growth of the organization and diminishes its capabilities. Cronin demonstrates that a state can weaken a group’s objectives by targeting its leader. She claims, “If a leader is captured and jailed, undermining his credibility and cutting off inflammatory communications are critical to demoralizing his following.”53 This is a very particular instance. Similarly, military repression has very limited productive outcomes.54 Still, while these efforts might not terminate the use of terrorism, they diminish the capability of a group to launch attacks. Edward Kaplan et al measure the strength of a terror organization using a terror-stock model that computes the recruitment of operatives in relation to counterterrorism activities such as arrests, killings, and interceptions55. Kaplan et al demonstrate the extent of the constraints counterterrorism endeavors put on terrorist organizations. Once counterterrorism undertakings make it too costly for an organization to launch terrorist attacks by diminishing its capabilities, the organization must cease its operations. However, this does not mean it will forsake terrorism as a tactic, but only stop using it temporarily.

Such wisdom predicts that an invasive expansive counterterrorism campaign by Israel should eradicate terrorist activity. The longest period in which neither Hamas nor the PLO/Fatah had engaged in terrorist activities was the three years following operation Cast Lead, in which the IDF entered the occupied territories and arrested, interrogated, killed, and exiled terrorist activists, as well as confiscated arms and destroyed underground infrastructure. In short, Israeli counterterrorism efforts work, for three years. Soon after, in 2012, Hamas returned to use terrorism against Israel. Repression holds as long as it is consistent and persistent. Having counterterrorism increase the costs of terrorism does not deter organizations from such tactics. As noted, terrorist organizations often begin as small, weak, and unknown movements, and they use terrorism to attract support, popular and material.

In trying to connect the use of terrorism to the achievement of strategic objectives, these wisdoms fail to observe that terrorism advances only organizational goals, not strategic. Such was the case with the PLO in the early 1990, when it used terrorism while negotiating with Israel only to delegitimize Hamas, which was using terrorism to undermine the PLO and the negotiations. Similarly, linking repression and strategy does not account for the growth of these groups and the fact that terrorism facilitates an organization’s growth.

In separating the two levels of strategy, my theory shows that an organization would choose not to use terrorism when its organizational objectives are met, and when there is an opportunity to advance its strategic objectives. Organizations use terrorism for organizational purposes that would increase their bargaining power and in the process advance their strategic goals.

Conclusion

Conventional wisdoms fail to explain under what circumstances terrorist organizations choose to change their strategy from terrorism to diplomacy because they fail to analyze the differences in using terrorism to advance organizational goals versus strategic ones. In analyzing the use of terrorism for advancing an organization’s objectives in two different levels, this paper demonstrates that terrorism is central to the group’s organizational survival, and has less to do with its strategic advancements. Looking at Fatah and Hamas, I sought to explain why one terrorist organization changed tactics while the other did not, given that the two have similar strategic objectives. Fatah had gained access to a legitimate political process and its constituents supported it. At that point, had Fatah continued using terrorism, it would have lost public support. These cases illuminated the centrality terrorism plays in advancing organizational objectives, but not strategic ones. Fatah and Hamas both used terrorism to raise their profile and increase their bargaining power. Fatah renounced terrorism because it had the opportunity to advance its strategic goals at a time in which public opinion supported such endeavors.

Such understanding of what role terrorism plays in an organization’s strategy has great implications regarding counterterrorism. While conventional wisdoms explain how to reduce terrorism, or stop it temporarily, my theory helps explain how to influence an organization to transform itself into a legitimate political entity, with which it is possible to interact vis-à-vis conventional political channels. Combining my theory with conventional wisdom, policy makers can facilitate both short-term and long-term solutions to terrorist threats. When a new terrorist organization threatens to surface, states can immediately explore legitimate political options to answer grievances and prevent escalation of violence. Furthermore, since public opinion is guided by threat perception, which is guided by exposure, states can attempt to manipulate public opinion. In the Palestinian territories, violence was supported when threat perception was high. Palestinian’s perception of an Israeli threat stemmed from their contact with Israelis, which was mostly confrontational with soldiers or settlers.56 Israel could increase Palestinian exposure to Israeli peaceful means, providing aid within the territories in hopes that it would reduce threat perception and increase popular support for diplomacy. Given that most counterterrorism campaigns actually have counter effective results in undermining an organization’s legitimacy and support, my theory helps guide policy makers in their planning of counterterrorism strategies.

This paper adopts Krause’s two-level framework and addresses previously examined questions in a new light. It suggests that the use of terrorism has the potential of achieving political participation. This raises the question of whether political participation can prevent terrorism. Further research should explore such questions using the two-level framework. Krause’s two-level framework provides political scientists with a new way of evaluating how terrorism serves organizations. As such, this paper advances Krause’s theory to explore unresolved puzzles in the study of terrorism.

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References

Alexander, Yonah. Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2002.

Alexander, Yonah. Palestinian Secular Terrorism: Profiles of Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2003.

Bloom, Mia M. “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding.”Political Science Quarterly119 (1) 2004: 61-88.

Crenshaw, Martha. Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes, and Consequences. New York: Routledge, 2011.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups.”International Security31 (1) 2006: 7-48.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Hasselknippe, Gro. “Palestinian Opinions on Peace and Conflict, Internal Affairs and Parliament Elections 2006 Results from Fafo polls in September and November–December 2005.” United States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200, Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute of Peace.

Kaplan, Edward H., Alex Mintz, Shaul Mishal, and Claudio Samban. “What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights From a Terror Stock Model.”Studies in Conflict & Terrorism28 (3) 2005: 225-35.

Krause, Peter. “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework to Transform a Deceptive Debate.”Security Studies22 (2) 2013 (04/01; 2014/12): 259-94.

Kurtz, Anat N. Fatah and the Politics of Violence: The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2003.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (2). July 9, 2001. Accessed December 10, 2014.

Pape, Robert A. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.”American Political Science Review97 (3) 2003: 343-61.

Piazza, James A. “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism: A Cross-National Study.”The Journal of Politics70 (1) 2008: 28-39.

Shamir, Jacob. “Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From Geneva to Disengagement to Kadima and Hamas.” United States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200, Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute of Peace.

Shikaki, Khalil. “Willing to Compromise: Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process.” United States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200, Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace. 1999.How terrorism ends.Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200, Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute of Peace, .

Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. Public Opinion: Israeli, Palestinian Support for Peace Accord Was Dropping Before Massacre. April 1, 1994. Accessed December 10, 2014.

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Endnotes

1.) Peter Krause, “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework to Transform a Deceptive Debate,”Security Studies22 (2) 2013 (04/01; 2014/12): 259-94.

2.) Ibid 272.

3.) Ibid.

4.) James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism: A Cross-National Study,”The Journal of Politics70 (1) 2008: 30.

5.) Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,”Political Science Quarterly119 (1) 2004: 85; James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism,” 30.

6.) Ibid 28.

7.) Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.”American Political Science Review97 (3) 2003: 343-61.

8.) Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2002: 47-72.

9.) Peter Krause, “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence,” 263-4.

10.) Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing,” 62-85; James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism,” 29.

11.) James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism,” 30.

12.) Peter Krause, “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence,” 273.

13.) James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism,” 31-32.

14.) Martha Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes, and Consequences. New York: Routledge, 2011, 219.

15.) Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,”International Security31 (1) 2006, 25; Martha Crenshaw in “How Terrorism Ends,”United States Institute of Peace. 1999. Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200, Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute of Peace: 3.

16.) Group would use violence despite of public opinion when it is aimed at tackling a rival group. However, this stems from the organizational goal of sustaining the group’s power and supremacy over other groups. For more, see Krause.

17.) Anat N. Kurtz, Fatah and the Politics of Violence: The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2003, 32.

18.) Ibid 30.

19.) Ibid 35-37.

20.) Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Secular Terrorism: Profiles of Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2003, 2; Anat N. Kurtz, Fatah and the Politics of Violence, 38.

21.) Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Secular Terrorism, 2-3.

22.) Ibid.

23.) Ibid 3.

24.) Anat N. Kurtz, Fatah and the Politics of Violence, 83-84.

25.) Ibid 84.

26.) Ibid 79.

27.) Anat N. Kurtz, Fatah and the Politics of Violence, 79-80.

28.) Ibid 80-82.

29.) Ibid 82.

30.) Ibid 121.

31.) Ibid 121-2.

32.) Anat N. Kurtz, Fatah and the Politics of Violence, 122.

33.) National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd

34.) According to GTD, between September 1987 and December 1990 terrorism decreased dramatically.

35.) Khalil Shikaki, “Willing to Compromise: Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace Process.” United States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200, Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute of Peace, 1.

36.) Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. Public Opinion: Israeli, Palestinian Support for Peace Accord Was Dropping Before Massacre. April 1, 1994. Accessed December 10, 2014.

37.) National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

38.) Ibid.

39.) James A. Piazza, “A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism,” 31-32.

40.) Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing,” 65.

41.) Ibid 67.

42.) National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).

43.) Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (2). July 9, 2001. Accessed December 10, 2014.

44.) Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing,” 77.

45.) Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing,” 77.

46.) Gro Hasselknippe, “Palestinian Opinions on Peace and Conflict, Internal Affairs and Parliament Elections 2006 Results from Fafo polls in September and November–December 2005” United States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200, Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute of Peace, 14.

47.) Ibid 27.

48.) Jacob Shamir, “Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: From Geneva to Disengagement to Kadima and Hamas.” United States Institute of Peace. Washington, DC (1200 17th St., NW, Suite 200, Washington 20036-3011): U.S. Institute of Peace, 37-40.

49.) Jacob Shamir, “Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” 13-14.

50.) Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.”352-3.

51.) Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends,” 24.

52.) Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing,” 85.

53.) Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends,” 22.

54.) Ibid 30-1.

55.) Edward H. Kaplan, Alex Mintz, Shaul Mishal, and Claudio Samban, “What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights From a Terror Stock Model,”Studies in Conflict & Terrorism28:3 (2005): 225-35.

56.) Khalil Shikaki, “Willing to Compromise,” 13.