Sisters in Solidarity: The Fight for Feminism in Modern Day China

Introduction

In September 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping took the stage to address the assembly at the Global Leaders Meeting on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment. In his speech, he identified four propositions to advance gender equality, among which included the active protection of women’s rights, the cultivation of a favourable global environment for gender parity, and the elimination of “out-dated mentalities and customs.”1 This declaration seemed to provide indication of changed, progressive attitudes towards women in China: The Chinese modern woman is independent rather than subservient, more empowered than her repressed historical counterparts, and earns her bread and butter instead of serving them on the breakfast table.

Yet international metrics of gender equality seem to suggest a different story. In a 2019 World Economic Forum study, China was ranked in the 105th position among 153 nations, a significant fall from its 57th position rank among 139 nations in 2008.2 Globally, China has also been subject to criticisms on gender-based discrimination and inequality, which have been largely attributed to the shortcomings of the state. Thus, this paper aims to investigate the conflicting narratives that have arisen in recent years by exploring the question: To what extent has feminism in modern day China been curtailed by the state, and what are the reasons underpinning this phenomenon?

Foundations for the Feminist Cause

Many political occurrences in modern day China have roots in the Maoist era. Physically, Mao’s presence looms over Beijing’s most prominent hallmark of political advocacy; his portrait faces squarely towards Tiananmen Square with both ears opened and listening to all sides, a marker of his omniscient presence in Chinese politics. Non-materially, his legacy cannot be understated either — not only are Mao’s quotes continually embraced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but many present-day developments, particularly in relation to women’s rights, also have roots in the Maoist era. In fact, some, particularly from the West, have ventured to proclaim 20th Century China as a Neo-Maoist regime.3 Whether or not this is accurate, the Xi government has remained hyper-aware of Mao’s legacy and often wields it to their advantage. In Xi’s own words, “Try to picture, if we fully repudiate Comrade Mao Zedong, can our party stand still? Can socialism stand still? They won’t be able to, and chaos is doomed to follow.”4

Before the Maoist era, the advancement of women’s rights could be argued as non-existent at worst and dilatory at best, especially given Confucian values that had underpinned Chinese society. In Confucian philosophy, the differentiation between husband and wife is a precondition for family harmony, which requires the complementarity of yin and yang forces represented by the wife and husband respectively.5 Indirectly, these often encouraged the manifestation of practices that oppressed women (as illustrated by foot-binding rituals), or produced hierarchies which inferiorised women (such as by confining them to the domestic sphere or treating them as mere appendages to men).6

However, social structures began to evolve swiftly following the 1919 May Fourth Movement, which is often viewed as a period marked by the rejection of Confucianism and the first instance where ideas of women’s emancipation were addressed.7 In fact, Mao himself condemned the oppression of women in impassioned articles and spoke against the “shameful system of arranged marriages.”8 These postures would translate into concrete gender-oriented policies during the Maoist era (1949 – 1976). For instance, the 1950 Marriage Law, which was the first official act passed by Mao’s CCP following the founding of the People's Republic of China, was regarded as the earliest nationwide “attempt... from the 1930s on to provide women more freedom and autonomy in marriage and divorce, as well as to abolish ‘feudal’ practices.”9 The law redefined women’s rights in China by outlawing traditional practices including polygamy, concubinage and foot binding,10 all of which Mao believed no longer belonged in the “new democratic” society.11 In theory, the law also extended divorce rights and the freedom of economic participation to women. These top-down legal provisions, in addition to social propaganda expounding the need to empower women such as in Mao’s famous Little Red Book,12 supplied the initial breakthrough required to kick-start the feminist movement in China. Beyond this, the CCP’s introduction of organisations, such as the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) in 1949, established key infrastructures that would play notable roles in leading the feminist agenda in the years following Mao’s reign.

Since the Maoist era, however, the women’s movement in China has evolved in complexity. While Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 “Reform and Opening-up” (改革开放) policy liberalised markets and opened employment opportunities for women,13 it also engendered a new host of problems. Not only did the gender gap vis-à-vis employment rates and wages widen,14 but the entire women’s movement and its social and cultural concerns also took a backseat, effectively overshadowed by talks of industry and investment, special economic zones and foreign capital.15 Moreover, the 1980s to 1990s were marked by a resurgence of traditional ideals of femininity which scorned upon the “iron woman” trope previously championed by Mao.16 Inadvertently, these events have contributed to the multifaceted, often convoluted, women’s movement observed in Chinese society today.

Fire In One Hand, Water In the Other: Have Efforts to Advance Feminism Been More Apparent than Real?

“We must firmly grasp the new zeitgeist of this era. We need to closely integrate China's development with the promotion of equal development of men and women, such that the women's cause can flourish with the times.”17 These words, laden with promise, were delivered in a talk with new members of the ACWF during the nascent period of Xi’s presidency in 2013.

Ostensibly, Xi’s statement mirrored Mao’s own famous pronouncement: “The times have changed, men and women are the same. Whatever men comrades can accomplish, women comrades can too.” Both addressed temporal concerns and stressed the need for the Chinese government, and society by extension, to stay relevant by aligning themselves with the spirit of the period. Yet there arguably exists an incongruity between promises that are made and quotidian reality.

Given that there are innumerable instances of state efforts to ameliorate women’s positions in Chinese society, only a few eminent and recent examples will be raised in the following two subsections. This will be followed by a third subsection that identifies the limitations of these initiatives, in an attempt to evaluate the true extent of curtailment (or empowerment if so proved) of feminism by Xi’s government.

Reducing Gendered Disparities: Legislative Action & Social Enablement by the State

Under Xi, it would appear that China has indeed made significant progress vis-a-vis gender rights. In terms of legislative action, Xi’s government has not only established quotas for women in civil service sectors,18 but also overseen the third programme of action (2011 –2020) for women’s development in China.19 Most notably, the adoption of the Anti-Domestic Violence Law in 2015, which provided an official state-approved legal definition of “domestic violence” and offers civil protective orders for victims, has been lauded by optimists as an exemplification of strides to reduce gender inequality.20 The law has been described as providing “tangible legal relief” for victims and indicating a “high-level state commitment to tackle domestic violence,” which has long been regarded as a prevalent problem given that it afflicts almost a third of Chinese families.21

Aside from the legal field, an increased assurance of social equalities and empowerment of women by the state has also been observed. In the realm of education, the average number of years that Chinese females spend in school has increased from 4.8 years in 1990 to 7.6 years in 2017.22 If education is the panacea to inequality, then these figures suggest that increased access to education has enabled women to be uplifted from disadvantaged positions that had previously been perpetuated by both systemic and cultural deficiencies. More broadly, Xi’s government has also claimed to have worked more closely with non-governmental organisations like the ACWF to encourage women to “take an active part in the democratic management and supervision of state and social affairs.”23 Such rallying calls for the participation of women in socio-political sectors could be viewed as manifestations of social empowerment championed by the state.

Moreover, while some have highlighted disparities between urban and rural women, the ACWF has endeavoured to overcome these criticisms through initiatives like “Spring Bud,” a project jointly managed with the China Children and Teenagers’ Foundation to uplift poverty-stricken girls “in primary and middle schools, impoverished female college students, and rural left-behind children.”24 In 2015 alone, this project rewarded US$116,000 worth of funding in educational scholarships to girls. To further bridge urban-rural rifts, training sessions organised by women’s federations on skills including farming technology, transferred employment and entrepreneurship have involved over five million rural women to date.

Additionally, according to the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, the National Working Committee on Children and Women under the State Council also serves as a consultation and coordination organ for Xi’s government. It prompts various state departments to focus on women’s issues and provide the “necessary human, financial and material resources… [through the supervision of] subordinates in all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government,” as well as in “prefectures and counties across China’s mainland.”25 This effort to cover the majority of China’s vast territory underlines the state’s efforts in universalising women’s empowerment in both urban and rural areas, without geographic discrimination.

Climbing up Corporate Ladders to Reach Half the Sky: State-Endorsed Economic Empowoment

Given the inextricable link between education and employment, women’s increased access to education has led to improved job opportunities for women, who had once been spurned from economic engagement by virtue of their gender. With the rise of tertiary industries, more Chinese women have earned prestigious degrees that have enabled them to enter high-paying industries like computer science, finance and communications.26 In fact, according to China’s State Council, equality has been more than achieved; based on statistics from 2018, women have outnumbered men with over 55% of tech start-ups being founded by females.27 Some of these women helm companies and brands that are household names in China. For example, Jean Liu, President of Didi Chuxing, has been credited for successfully pushing Uber Technologies out of the Chinese market to establish her firm as China’s ride-hailing leader, while Miffy Chen leads multi-billion-dollar company Alibaba Group as Vice President. Moreover, a 2019 white paper titled “Equality, Development and Sharing: Progress of Women's Cause in 70 Years Since New China's Founding” reported that women currently make up 40% of China’s labour force—in fact, 340 million women were active in the workforce in 2017, a statistic which has doubled since 1978.28

Arguably, these achievements could not have been realised without the support of the state. In the age of heightened neoliberalism and competition where economic prowess heavily determines status, it is incontrovertible that China has made strides to establish its presence as an international economic superpower. To achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” advocated by the Xi administration, whose ambition constitutes building an economically superior and prosperous society by 2021 to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the CCP,29 the Chinese government has implemented a panoply of policies to support private and domestic firms by providing them with the means to compete internationally.30 Given the state’s concern over the growth of the Chinese economy, meritocracy has come to the forefront vis-a-vis entrepreneurship and workforce opportunities. After all, if women prove themselves to be the most competent choices for a given economic role and are primed to help boost China’s economy, then there exists no reason for the state or any other institution to obstruct this.

Thus, by allowing—and in some cases enabling (for example, by ensuring the right to equal employment regardless of gender as enshrined in Articles 3 and 27 of the Employment Promotion Law31)—women to enter competitive industries and climb corporate ladders, the state assists in creating a new culture that is not inimical to women’s economic participation and empowerment. Even if efforts are not explicitly targeted at bridging gender-based fissures such as through gender quotas or affirmative action, the state’s endorsement and corollary cultivation of a kind of meritocratic culture that discounts gender from the general economic equation could be perceived as positively advancing the feminist cause. This explains why key leaders like Huang Xiaowei, Vice President of the All-China Women's Federation, have contended: “The great achievements China has made in the development of women's cause is attributed to the leadership of the CCP.”32

Limitations of Manifestations: Evaluating the Extents of Empowerment

However, while the state has indeed made strides to improve the status of women in modern day China, these efforts remain limited. There have been instances of actions taken by the current administration which suggest appear antithetical to the advancement of gender parity. Beyond this, however, even the initiatives highlighted in Sections I and II are oftentimes plagued by limitations and underlying motives that critics have accused to be pernicious to the very cause they purport to champion.

In September 2015, Xi pledged $10 million to UN Women in a bid to reaffirm China’s commitment to gender parity.33 However, this move received an inordinate amount of backlash, with many criticising the Chinese government for its duplicitous manoeuvre vis-à-vis its attempts to glorify China’s status on the world’s stage whilst persecuting feminists within its borders. In March 2015, a group of five feminist activists were detained for engaging in activism to protest against the commonplace occurrence of sexual harassment on public transportation.34 Aptly named the Feminist Five, the group had planned to distribute stickers on sexual harassment in subways and buses.35 However, they were arrested by the police before being able to implement this. According to feminist sinology scholar Wang Zheng, “The attempt to criminalise legitimate feminist activism is... a mockery of the state’s declared aspiration to the rule of law, revealing a huge gap between the words and deeds of the state.”36 Critics have argued that this suppression of activism not only unveils the state’s duplicitous orientation towards and physical curtailment of the feminist cause, but also signals a rollback of sorts when pitted against the historical context of the political environment during the post-Tiananmen Square period.

Examples like these have shown to be a recurring occurrence rather than an aberration. 2018 marked the year when the #MeToo movement made its foray into China’s social media scene. Victims of sexual harassment and assault in China were encouraged to share personal encounters and voice their concerns — not only did known experts like Tsinghua Professor Liu Yu speak out on Weibo about their thoughts on #MeToo and lead public debates on it, but many other netizens such as former doctoral student Luo Xixi, whose accusations regarding acts of sexual harassment performed by her former supervisor Chen Xiaowu garnered almost 4 million views the next day, also participated in the movement’s discussion.37 In light of online traction of the movement, state authorities began removing and censoring content including petitions and posts.38 In typical innovative fashion, netizens came up with a new hashtag #米兔 (“mi tu”), which translates to “rice bunny,” in rallied attempts to circumvent censorship of testimonies and advocacy. The #MeToo movement arguably equipped women with a platform and voice intended to serve as tools of empowerment despite—or perhaps because of—censorship.

Moreover, while the state has attempted to increase the involvement of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), many of them remain under its aegis. The ACWF, which is often viewed as the most accredited feminist organisation in China, is de jure a quasi-governmental organisation.39 Although the ACWF has faced mounting pressures to combat gender-based problems as “China’s most recognised organisation for women and children,”40 it often needs to balance this without subverting the state’s authority. This mainly stems from the reality that the ACWF is dependent on government funding for its programmes and daily operations.41 While the ACWF has seen an increase in financial independence by accruing funds from the enterprises that it runs, many of their large-scale programmes still require state funding, which is contingent on the government’s approval.42 To a degree, this limits the nature and content of the ACWF’s programmes, given that its agendas are often contingent on state approval.

Generally speaking, women-oriented NGOs are also fairly limited in China today. Although the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 prompted a growth in the number of feminist NGOs, the 2017 “Foreign NGO Law”—which has been speculated to be a product of the events surrounding the detention of the Feminist Five—was introduced to impose restraints on NGO registration and activities.43 According to modern Chinese literature and culture scholar Hui Faye Xiao, “Public spaces expanded by collective efforts made by NGOs [and] civil organisations… have been gradually encroached on by the tightening control of the authoritarian party-state,… [leading to] compromised conditions for activism.”44 This has led academics like Jun Li to assert that “the relationship between NGOs and the state has not yet been institutionalised,” and this “ambiguity and uncertainty of the status of NGOs affect their development” in adverse ways.45 Thus, even if a certain group of existing NGOs are authorised to carry out feminist activities, the extent of their influence is curtailed.

Further, while the state has made strides to encourage women to enter and strive in the economic sphere, gender parity initiatives are often introduced to fulfil a larger economic cause. While some might contend that underlying motives could be overlooked since they do not change the beneficial outcomes for working women in China, one could also argue that intent lends perspective on the extent to which other feminist-related movements and initiatives outside the framework endorsed by the state are permitted. In fact, it could even be said that Xi’s current campaign to “reinforce traditional family values” has not only curtailed the feminist movement in China, but also intensified the burden on women. This campaign calls for the people to “integrate their personal family dreams with the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation,”46 and has been echoed by the ACWF in its 2015 Most Beautiful Family Campaign (最美家庭) which highlighted Xi-approved “model families” consisting only of women who have, in essence, committed themselves to traditional familial roles like caring for their in-laws and husbands. This ties back in with the CCP’s goals of maintaining “harmony and social stability.” For Chinese women, the campaign effectively illuminates a spotlight on domestic obligations while casting economic roles into the shadows.

Behind the Gaze of the State: Reasons Underpinning Curtailment of Feminist Movement in China

In China today, capitalism has overridden socialist institutions.47 In East Asian welfare regime scholarship, the “productivist welfare capitalist” regime thesis first posited by Ian Holliday has garnered much attention given its view that countries including China consist of regimes where social policy is subordinate to economic motivations.48 While some have charted the evolution of China’s approach towards social policy and provided tweaks to this model such that it is nuanced to fit the modern-day context, the fact that the economic agenda takes precedence over everything else remains a reality today. By logical syllogism, this has invariably influenced the prioritisation of Chinese women’s rights, which are persistently relegated to the background as economic concerns take the foreseat. Thus, while economic priority might not be a motive that consciously impedes the progress of feminism in China, the former inadvertently curtails the latter. More than this, however, women’s rights and autonomy should be perceived as an end in and of itself, and never the means to or convenient by-product of another goal. Granted, this takes a highly subjective view and differs based on varying sub-types of feminist ideology, but it also lends some perspective on the issue in relation to China’s politico-economic context.

More interestingly, however, is the concept that the feminist movement has been curtailed because communism and feminism are incompatible. This is not to say that there is fundamental incompatibility between feminism and communist or Marxist theory. In fact, while Marx never developed a theory on gender and feminism, his ideas on class and capitalism inevitably inform our understanding of how economic concerns might lead to the oppression of women, such as through the capitalist exploitation of women’s labour as analysed in Marx’s Capital Vol. 1 and the propertisation of women by the capitalist class.49 In this sense, communism could be perceived as being complementary and sympathetic to the feminist cause given that the former’s call for the abolition of class simultaneously assists in the obliteration of gender-based oppression.

However, the idea is that communism, when manifested in reality, is incompatible to the feminist cause. Mihaela Miroiu, for instance, has proffered that communism and feminism are irreconcilable because communism is nothing other than “state patriarchy” in practice. This arguably proves true in the Chinese context, which has a political tradition of using the term “Chinese characteristics” to justify everything from its repressive policies to its draconian regime. According to Miroiu, “women were celebrated as [the] collective anonymous entities [of] Mother [or] Worker” in “classical patriarchal societies,” a description that appears to provide a rather accurate assessment of modern day China given its return to “traditional family values” that only endorse normative patriarchal structures in society.50 By dictating a paradigm of the ideal woman and the roles she ought to fulfil for the sake of helping achieve the “communist goal,” the Chinese communist state thrusts women into a narrow framework that masculinises the economy by shifting economic responsibility away from females and towards males. This creates an encouragement of dependence of females on males by the state, and effectively undermines the feminist movement.

Moreover, some have argued that patriarchy and authoritarianism cannot be divorced from each other. According to Leta Hong Fincher, “Patriarchy is at the centre of the Chinese government’s ability to control their population and to maintain authoritarianism, from the beginning of the Chinese Revolution to the present day.”51 This might sound like a bold statement, but it reflects the inextricable nature of patriarchy and authoritarianism, where the former is wielded as a tool to realise the latter, and so compromises the feminist movement in its quest. Within the field of politics, the assertion that supreme governance has been a big reason for the CCP’s survival is not an uncommon one.52 Yet how does this pertain to the feminist cause? One interpretation is that the subjugation of the feminist cause is necessary to ensuring the survival of the CCP. Feminism is perceived as challenging the norms and structures dictated by the state-party, and by the same token challenging its very authority. In Miroiu’s words, “All dictatorial regimes (which has been argued by some to describe China53) are ‘messianic’ per se and cannot tolerate any other ‘isms’,” of which “feminism” is included.54 Attempts to curtail feminism can thus be explained by desires to eliminate influences that could potentially pose a threat to state supremacy.

However, making sweeping statements that the state deplores feminism in its entirety may not be true. In fact, the CCP is arguably not opposed to feminism per se, but rather the activism that accompanies it. One perspective is that even if the state has relegated feminism to other larger goals, it has still undeniably enabled and pushed for the realisation of certain feminist outcomes. The biggest problem, however, arises when feminist activism and advocacy from civil society occurs. This is especially considering that grassroots feminism in China today has deviated significantly from previous pushes for feminism that more frequently comprised state-mandated, top-down political campaigns.55 As such, bottom-up activism against gender inequality is characterised as “disturbances” that could rupture social stability,56 thus prompting clampdowns.

Conclusion

Feminism has grown to be a complex, multifaceted topic of conversation in China. It has witnessed a series of peaks and troughs that have both advanced and regressed the women’s movement since Mao’s era. Undeniably, the state’s adoption of certain state laws, initiatives and fostering of a culture that normalises working women rather than portraying them as misfits or anomalies have created a more equalised environment. Yet feminist initiatives also face limitations which have engendered outcomes that do not always achieve the gendered goals they initially aimed to purport.

It should be acknowledged that the research question might not be an inherently fair one given that the terms “feminism” and “curtailment” are highly subjective and relative. Not only does the very definition of “feminism” differ widely based on geographical contexts and thereby differentiate Chinese standards from Western ones, but the extent to which “feminism” has been realised in China could also be assessed in temporal terms by juxtaposing modern day realities with the historical treatment of women. The extent of “curtailment” is also greatly dependent on the geographic frame of reference that is adopted—while the Chinese state might contend that curtailment of the feminist cause has been kept to a minimum, Western perspectives would likely counter these claims based on their standards. Given cultural relativity and conditionality, it is ultimately difficult not only to provide a normative judgement on gender parity, but also to determine whether definitions of it can be transported across geographical territories or should remain context-specific instead.

---

References

Abbott, J. (2019). Of Grass Mud Horses and Rice Bunnies: Chinese Internet Users Challenge Beijing’s Censorship and Internet Controls. Asian Politics & Policy, 11(1), 162-168. doi: 10.1111/aspp.12442.

Anti-Domestic Violence Law of the People's Republic of China (Order No. 37 of the President of the PRC). (2015). Retrieved 29 March 2020, from http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=103955&p_count=1&p_classification=01.04.

Aoyama, R. (2016). “One Belt, One Road”: China's New Global Strategy. Journal Of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 5(2), 3-22. doi: 10.1080/24761028.2016.11869094.

Bailey, P. (2012). Women and Gender in Twentieth-Century China. Macmillan International Higher Education.

China Focus: China publishes white paper on progress of women's cause in 70 years - Xinhua. (2019). Retrieved 26 March 2020, from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/19/c_138405494.htm.

Chinese Revolution. (n.d.). CCP Social Reforms. Retrieved 28 March 2020, from https://alphahistory.com/chineserevolution/ccp-social-reforms/.

Choi, Y. (2012). End of the Era of Productivist Welfare Capitalism? Diverging Welfare Regimes in East Asia. Asian Journal of Social Science, 40(3), 275-294. Retrieved April 10, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/43498840.

Economy, E. (2019). China’s Neo-Maoist Moment. Retrieved 28 March 2020, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-10-01/chinas-neo-maoist-moment.

Federici, S. (2018). Marx and Feminism. Triplec: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal For A Global Sustainable Information Society, 16(2), 468-475. doi: 10.31269/triplec.v16i2.1004.

Gender Equality and Women's Development in China. (2020). Retrieved 30 March 2020, from http://www.china-un.ch/eng/rqrd/jblc/t210715.htm.

Gillezeau, N. (2019). How young Chinese women are taking on Xi Jinping. Retrieved 8 April 2020, from https://www.afr.com/politics/how-young-chinese-women-are-taking-on-xi-jinping-20190306-h1c2wd.

Haar, E. (2019). China’s Feminist Future | Townsend Center for the Humanities. Retrieved 7 April 2020, from https://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/blog/chinas-feminist-future.

Han, S. (2017). China's New Domestic Violence Law: Keeping Victims Out of Harm's Way?. Paul Tsai China Center At Yale Law School.

Holliday, I. (2000). Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia. Political Studies, 48(4), 706-723. doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.00279.

Jing, L. Chinese Women Under the Economic Reform: Gains and Losses. Harvard Asia Pacific Review, 89-90.

Jones, C. (2015). China's Xi Jinping says empowering women is vital; critics note poor treatment. Retrieved 1 April 2020, from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/09/27/chinas-president-xi-jinping-says-empowerment-women-vital-but-critics-note-his-nations-poor-treatment-some-women-activists/72929602/.

Kobayashi, S., Baobo, J., & Sano, J. (1999). The “Three Reforms” in China: Progress and Outlook. Retrieved 29 March 2020, from https://www.jri.co.jp/english/periodical/rim/1999/RIMe199904threereforms/.

Le Corre, P. (2018). China: More Authoritarianism, More Uncertainty. Retrieved 7 April 2020, from https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/05/china-more-authoritarianism-more-uncertainty-pub-75749.

Li, C. (2015). The Confucian philosophy of harmony. London: Routledge

Li, J. (2013). The Growth and Dilemma of Women’s NGOs in China: A Case Study of the Beijing Zhongze Legal Consulting Service Center for Women. Social Issues In China, 85-105. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4614-2224-2_5.

Lim, L. (2018). China’s #MeToo censorship sidestepped by creative netizens. Retrieved 2 April 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/short-reads/article/2134847/chinas-metoo-censorship-bypassed-through.

Ma, Q. (2009). Non-governmental Organizations in Contemporary China. Routledge.

Mai, J. (2020). Can China ever move on from Mao Zedong?. Retrieved 27 March 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2018050/can-china-ever-move-mao-zedong.

Meng, B., & Huang, Y. (2017). Patriarchal capitalism with Chinese characteristics: gendered discourse of ‘Double Eleven’ shopping festival. Cultural Studies, 31(5), 659-684. doi: 10.1080/09502386.2017.1328517.

Miroiu, M. (2007). Communism was a State Patriarchy, not State Feminism. Aspasia, 1(1). doi: 10.3167/asp.2007.010110.

Shen, Y. (2020). Feminism in China: An Analysis of Advocates, Debates, and Strategies. FES China.

'Spring Bud' Project Offers Financial Aid to Poverty-stricken Female Students in Xiamen - All China Women's Federation. (2015). Retrieved 30 March 2020, from http://www.womenofchina.cn/html/special/grassroots_women/fujian/15083155-1.htm.

Wang, Q. (2018). Young Feminist Activists in Present-Day China: A New Feminist Generation?. China Perspectives, (1996-4617), 59-58.

Wang, Y. (2018). Chinese Courts Give Domestic Abusers a Pass. Retrieved 3 April 2020, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/11/26/chinese-courts-give-domestic-abusers-pass.

Xi Jinping tries to give private business owners a ‘confidence boost’. (2018). Retrieved 1 April 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2171267/xi-jinping-tells-chinas-private-business-owners-you-can.

Xiao, H. (2019). Digital media powers Chinese grassroots feminism. Retrieved 4 April 2020, from https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/09/05/digital-media-powers-chinese-grassroots-feminism/.

Yang, Y. (2018). A who’s who of women leaders in China’s technology industry. Retrieved 29 March 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/tech/china-tech/article/2136271/whos-who-women-leaders-chinas-tech-industry.

Zhang, P. (2019). China goes backwards on gender equality list but does better on education. Retrieved 26 March 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3042650/china-goes-backwards-global-gender-equality-list-does-better.

陈, 蓓. (2020). China's laws against employment discrimination - China - Chinadaily.com.cn. Retrieved 2 April 2020, from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/13/content_17503812.htm.

习近平谈妇女工作金句：支持妇女建功立业 实现人生理想和梦想. (2018). Retrieved 29 March 2020, from http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1029/c164113-30367608.html.

---

Endnotes

1.) Golley, J., Farrelly, P., & Jaivin, L. (2019). Power (p. 139). Canberra: ANU Press.

2.) Zhang, P. (2019). China goes backwards on gender equality list but does better on education. Retrieved 26 March 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3042650/china-goes-backwards-global-gender-equality-list-does-better.

3.) Economy, E. (2019). China’s Neo-Maoist Moment. Retrieved 28 March 2020, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-10-01/chinas-neo-maoist-moment.

4.) Mai, J. (2020). Can China ever move on from Mao Zedong?. Retrieved 27 March 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2018050/can-china-ever-move-mao-zedong.

5.) Li, C. (2015). The Confucian philosophy of harmony. London: Routledge

6.) Shen, Y. (2020). Feminism in China: An Analysis of Advocates, Debates, and Strategies. FES China.

7.) Yeh, W. (1994). Middle County Radicalism: The May Fourth Movement in Hangzhou. The China Quarterly, 903.

8.) Mao, Z. (1919). Miss Chao's Suicide. Marxists.org. Retrieved 28 March 2020, from https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1919/miss-chao.htm.

9.) Bailey, P. (2012). Women and Gender in Twentieth-Century China. Macmillan International Higher Education.

10.) As mentioned previously, these traditional practices were ones that Mao advocated against during the May Fourth Movement through his editorial pieces.

11.) Chinese Revolution. (n.d.). CCP Social Reforms. Retrieved 28 March 2020, from https://alphahistory.com/chineserevolution/ccp-social-reforms/.

12.) For instance, the call for Chinese citizens to “unite and take part in production and political activity to improve the economic and political status of women” was included in Mao’s Little Red Book.

13.) Jing, L. Chinese Women Under the Economic Reform: Gains and Losses. Harvard Asia Pacific Review, 89-90.

14.) Shen, Y. (2020). Feminism in China: An Analysis of Advocates, Debates, and Strategies. FES China.

15.) Kobayashi, S., Baobo, J., & Sano, J. (1999). The “Three Reforms” in China: Progress and Outlook. Retrieved 29 March 2020, from https://www.jri.co.jp/english/periodical/rim/1999/RIMe199904threereforms/.

16.) Jing, L. Chinese Women Under the Economic Reform: Gains and Losses. Harvard Asia Pacific Review, 89-90.

17.) 习近平谈妇女工作金句：支持妇女建功立业 实现人生理想和梦想. (2018). Retrieved 29 March 2020, from http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1029/c164113-30367608.html.

18.) Jing, L. Chinese Women Under the Economic Reform: Gains and Losses. Harvard Asia Pacific Review, 89-90.

19.) Angeloff, T., & Lieber, M. (2012). Equality, Did You Say? China Perspectives, 2012(4), 17–24. doi: 10.4000/chinaperspectives.6014

20.) Anti-Domestic Violence Law of the People's Republic of China (Order No. 37 of the President of the PRC). (2015). Retrieved 29 March 2020, from http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=103955&p_count=1&p_classification=01.04.

21.) Han, S. (2017). China's New Domestic Violence Law: Keeping Victims Out of Harm's Way?. Paul Tsai China Center At Yale Law School.

22.) NüVoices. (2019). Q&A: Young women discuss gender and education in China today. Retrieved 29 March 2020, from https://nuvoices.com/2019/09/04/qa-young-women-discuss-gender-and-education-in-china-today/.

23.) Gender Equality and Women's Development in China. (2020). Retrieved 30 March 2020, from http://www.china-un.ch/eng/rqrd/jblc/t210715.htm.

24.) 'Spring Bud' Project Offers Financial Aid to Poverty-stricken Female Students in Xiamen - All China Women's Federation. (2015). Retrieved 30 March 2020, from http://www.womenofchina.cn/html/special/grassroots_women/fujian/15083155-1.htm.

25.) Gender Equality and Women's Development in China. (2020). Retrieved 25 March 2020, from http://www.china-un.ch/eng/rqrd/jblc/t210715.htm.

26.) Ibid.

27.) Yang, Y. (2018). A who’s who of women leaders in China’s technology industry. Retrieved 28 March 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/tech/china-tech/article/2136271/whos-who-women-leaders-chinas-tech-industry.

28.) China Focus: China publishes white paper on progress of women's cause in 70 years - Xinhua. (2019). Retrieved 26 March 2020, from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/19/c_138405494.htm.

29.) Aoyama, R. (2016). “One Belt, One Road”: China's New Global Strategy. Journal Of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 5(2), 3-22. doi: 10.1080/24761028.2016.11869094.

30.) Xi Jinping tries to give private business owners a ‘confidence boost’. (2018). Retrieved 1 April 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2171267/xi-jinping-tells-chinas-private-business-owners-you-can.

31.) 陈, 蓓. (2020). China's laws against employment discrimination - China - Chinadaily.com.cn. Retrieved 2 April 2020, from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/13/content_17503812.htm.

32.) China Focus: China publishes white paper on progress of women's cause in 70 years - Xinhua. (2019). Retrieved 26 March 2020, from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/19/c_138405494.htm.

33.) Jones, C. (2015). China's Xi Jinping says empowering women is vital; critics note poor treatment. Retrieved 1 April 2020, from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/09/27/chinas-president-xi-jinping-says-empowerment-women-vital-but-critics-note-his-nations-poor-treatment-some-women-activists/72929602/.

34.) Zheng, W. (2015). Detention of the Feminist Five in China. Feminist Studies, 41(2), 476-482. doi:10.15767/feministstudies.41.2.476.

35.) Wang, Q. (2018). Young Feminist Activists in Present-Day China: A New Feminist Generation?. China Perspectives, (1996-4617), 59-58.

36.) Zheng, W. (2015). Detention of the Feminist Five in China. Feminist Studies, 41(2), 476-482. doi:10.15767/feministstudies.41.2.476.

37.) Abbott, J. (2019). Of Grass Mud Horses and Rice Bunnies: Chinese Internet Users Challenge Beijing’s Censorship and Internet Controls. Asian Politics & Policy, 11(1), 162-168. doi: 10.1111/aspp.12442.

38.) Lim, L. (2018). China’s #MeToo censorship sidestepped by creative netizens. Retrieved 2 April 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/short-reads/article/2134847/chinas-metoo-censorship-bypassed-through.

39.) Han, S. (2017). China's New Domestic Violence Law: Keeping Victims Out of Harm's Way?. Paul Tsai China Center At Yale Law School.

40.) Ma, Q. (2009). Non-Governmental Organizations in Contemporary China. Routledge.

41.) Ibid.

42.) Ibid.

43.) Xiao, H. (2019). Digital media powers Chinese grassroots feminism. Retrieved 4 April 2020, from https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/09/05/digital-media-powers-chinese-grassroots-feminism/.

44.) Ibid.

45.) Li, J. (2013). The Growth and Dilemma of Women’s NGOs in China: A Case Study of the Beijing Zhongze Legal Consulting Service Center for Women. Social Issues In China, 85-105. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4614-2224-2_5.

46.) Ibid.

47.) Meng, B., & Huang, Y. (2017). Patriarchal capitalism with Chinese characteristics: gendered discourse of ‘Double Eleven’ shopping festival. Cultural Studies, 31(5), 659-684. doi: 10.1080/09502386.2017.1328517.

48.) Holliday, I. (2000). Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia. Political Studies, 48(4), 706-723. doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.00279

49.) Federici, S. (2018). Marx and Feminism. Triplec: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal For A Global Sustainable Information Society, 16(2), 468-475. doi: 10.31269/triplec.v16i2.1004.

50.) Miroiu, M. (2007). Communism was a State Patriarchy, not State Feminism. Aspasia, 1(1). doi: 10.3167/asp.2007.010110.

51.) Haar, E. (2019). China’s Feminist Future | Townsend Center for the Humanities. Retrieved 7 April 2020, from https://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/blog/chinas-feminist-future.

52.) Le Corre, P. (2018). China: More Authoritarianism, More Uncertainty. Retrieved 7 April 2020, from https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/05/china-more-authoritarianism-more-uncertainty-pub-75749.

53.) Cabestan, J. (2019). China Tomorrow. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

54.) Miroiu, M. (2007). Communism was a State Patriarchy, not State Feminism. Aspasia, 1(1). doi: 10.3167/asp.2007.010110.

55.) Xiao, H. (2019). Digital media powers Chinese grassroots feminism. Retrieved 4 April 2020, from https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/09/05/digital-media-powers-chinese-grassroots-feminism/.

56.) Gillezeau, N. (2019). How young Chinese women are taking on Xi Jinping. Retrieved 8 April 2020, from https://www.afr.com/politics/how-young-chinese-women-are-taking-on-xi-jinping-20190306-h1c2wd.