The Positive Impact of African Union Forces in Darfur

The issue of sovereignty is a very hotly debated issue. However, when there is evidence of an ongoing humanitarian crisis, the international community should not stand aside and watch as thousands of innocent people are slaughtered (as happened in Rwanda in 1994). The AMIS’ “mandate of observers who cannot engage the combatants nor stop the bloodshed” does not help the mission, because legally they do not have the right to interfere in the conflict, a rule that has been broken many times for the sake of civilian protection (Wadlow, p.88). Thus, it is very challenging for the AU to be an effective presence to stop the violence in Sudan due to the lack of basic essentials and a clear and strong mandate focused on civilian protection and disarmament of the Janjaweed and other rebel forces. Hopefully, the integration of AMIS into the UN peacekeeping forces will put additional international pressure on Khartoum to stop the violence and return to the negotiating table.

In analyzing the impact of the AMIS on building peace in Sudan, it is necessary to look at the effectiveness of the AU’s mission in addressing the drivers of the conflict. Overall, the mission was unsuccessful due to the failure of the AU to address the issues of disarmament and demobilization of the Janjaweed forces, and the failure to address the issues of land and water resources as well as ongoing national power struggles. By looking at the Abuja agreement of 2005, it can be seen that the focus of the AU is to stop hostilities and disarm the military fractions within the Sudan, which in no way addresses the roots of the conflict. Hostilities in Sudan often start very soon after a particular agreement is reached, partially due to the fact that the mediating party fails to reach the goals established in the agreement and because the agreement does not establish a timeline or particular paths that would lead towards resolution of the conflict. Stopping the conflict is just a scratch on the surface of the problem, which requires a reevaluation of the interests of the parties and the goals that they are trying to reach. In order for the parties to stop the hostilities, they need to have something in return, like military protection of the civilians from governmental abuses, which the AMIS cannot provide due to insufficient troops numbers as well as the presence of Sudan’s officers within peacekeeping missions inside Darfur. After the initial hostilities cease and the parties feel safe negotiating with a government who cannot use intimidation and force to get its way, then mediators could lead the peace process by driving at the satisfaction of the interests and not positions of the warring parties. The chances of such outcomes are slim, due to the missing pieces to such processes (like sufficient troop levels and international pressure), which would force parties to talk and come up with an acceptable compromise.

Despite the AMIS’ failure to stop the violence in Sudan, its presence in Darfur can be attributed to the well-being of the civilian population that is under its watch. The AU needs to be credited for its efforts to intervene in the conflict due to the fact that it “is the world’s only regional or international organization that explicitly recognizes the right to intervene in a member state on humanitarian and human rights grounds” (Cohen, p.52). History shows that states are usually more likely to engage in a military conflict then in humanitarian ones, like in the case of Rwanda or Bosnia. Such inaction could be justified by the lack of a concrete and solid definition of a humanitarian crisis by the international community. Many international IGO’s are centered toward having some reference to intervention, but it usually has to do with a military attack or invasion, not an ongoing massacre. On the contrary, the AU in its charter recognizes the importance of intervention in humanitarian crisis, which seems to be on the rise in the twenty-first century due to the exacerbation of the on-going issues that are usually centered on rights, land, and/or resource access and distribution. Even the low-numbered AU mission provided safety for a number of civilians under its watch, despite the absence of a clear mandate and instruction on how to respond to the slaughter of civilians.

Like UN peacekeepers in Rwanda in 1990’s, AU forces saved lives and made peoples’ live easier by providing security and keeping Janjaweed forces at a distance. The presence of AMIS troops at camps where IDP live works as a deterrent against government forces, who would otherwise attack camps if there were no observer troops. As Paul Williams points out “in addition, in the areas where it {AMIS} established a presence, both the security and humanitarian situations improved …and its presence “‘provided a very positive influence’”. In particular, the number of clashes between the belligerent parties diminished, as did the number of attacks on civilians” (p.178-179). Sudan’s poor infrastructure, with very few asphalt roads without lighting, has put a strain on observers as they continue to monitor the area surrounding the camps. However, despite the the obstacles AMIS faces, its troops have been working to the best of their ability to protect civilians and show government forces that they are will resist its murderous rampages.

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International mediation, or lack thereof, has been one of the central issues in world politics as the international community went through the third and latest wave of democratization after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many states broke up due to internal issues and ethnic division which were brought up to the surface thanks to the demise of former authoritarian governments. However, some states like Sudan experienced years of civil war, despite the fact that the state did not break up and go through the democratization. Parties to the conflict have been fighting for a long time, and there seems to be no end to the violence, despite by an attempt of the AU to mediate the conflict and bring hostilities to a close. Lack of international attention could be one of the reasons why the conflict has been allowed to go on for so long, a sad fact that has numerous instances in recent world history.

The reluctant attitude of the West to other African problem is a serious issue, because the UN, EU and NATO (one of the major and stronger IGO’s) could have played a significant role in mediation through peacekeeping operations and general interest in the humanitarian crisis in Sudan. Recently, the world has seen many humanitarian crises, which do not have a specific definition in international law. Thus there is no clear action plan that would allow an IGO to act upon such developments. Military conflicts of the past seem to fade away into history, and humanitarian catastrophes seem to be on the rise around the globe. They need to be dealt with in a fast and efficient way by regional and Western states without paralyzing a state’s reaction to engage globally, and weakening national political interests in other regions of the world.

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References

Class lecture. Professor Darren Kew. February 21, 2008.

Cohen, Roberta, William O’Neill. “Last Stand in Sudan.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists March 2006: 51-58.

Daly, M.W. Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide. Cambridge: University Press, 2007.

Gompert, David, et al. “Learning from Darfur: Building a Net-Capable African Force to Stop Mass Killing.” National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security. 2005: 5+.

Human Rights Watch. January 2005. Human Right Watch. 8 May 2008. http://www.hrw.org/wr2k5/darfur/3.htm

Kew, Darren. “Nelson Mandela in Burundi: An Analysis of the Eminent Person Mediator in Africa” UMASS Boston.

Piiparinen, Touko. “Reconsidering the Silence over the Ultimate Crime: a Functional Shift in Crisis Management from the Rwandan Genocide to Darfur” Journal of Genocide Research 9.1 (2007): 71-91.

Udombana, Nsongurua. “Still Playing Dive with Lives: Darfur and Security Council Resolution 1706” Third World Quarterly 28.1 (2007): 97-116.

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United Nations. 21 April 2008. United Nations Documentation. 8 May 2008. http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/specpk.htm

Vehnamaki, Mika. “Darfur Scorched: looming genocide in Western Sudan” Journal of Genocide Research 8.1 (2006): 51-82.

Wadlow Rene. “The Darfur Peace Agreement is not Peace” International Journal on World Peace XXIII.1 (2006): 86-88.

Waal, Alex. War in Darfur and the Search for Peace. Cambridge: Global Equity Initiative, 2007.

Williams, Paul. “Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan.” International Peacekeeping June 2006: 168-183.